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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Adoption is an important phenomenon in the U.S. In 2000, about 1.6 million or 2.5% of all children
were adopted. Of these, 87% were U.S.-born and adopted through the domestic-adoption channel.
In terms of revenues, the adoption industry is a substantial one, generating approximately 2-3 billion
dollars annually.1
In most cases, a successful domestic adoption is the result of a match between a birth mother
(BMO hereafter) who seeks to relinquish her child, and prospective adoptive parents (PAPs here-
after). The underlying matching process involves a bilateral search characterized by several layers
of mediation: Typically, adoption agencies represent BMOs, while PAPs work vis-à-vis adoption
agencies, lawyers, or facilitators.
According to the Census, 54% of U.S.-born adopted children under the age of 10 are female,
and 18% are African-American.2 In contrast, girls and African-American represent 48% and 15%
of all children, respectively. These differences can be explained by either the preferences of PAPs
(the demand side), or the characteristics of children relinquished for adoption by BMOs (the supply
side). In this paper, we exploit the unique nature of a new data set documenting the operations of an
adoption facilitator in order to disentangle demand and supply effects on outcomes. We identify the
preferences of PAPs over the attributes of children relinquished for adoption, the BMOs’ choices,
and the factors that determine ultimate outcomes (i.e., a successful adoption, a decision to parent by
the BMO, or the child’s placement in foster care).
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we provide a direct assessment of parents’ pref-
erences over children’s attributes, in particular gender and race. Unlike consumers’ preferences (that
are observable through market behavior) or preferences over marriage partners (that are revealed in
dating patterns),3 very little is known about parents’ preferences over children’s attributes.4 For the
1See the Census 2000 and Riben (2007).
2These figures are derived from the authors’ own tabulation using the 5% PUMS.
3See the recent papers by Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, and Simonson (2006, 2008), Hitch, Hortacsu, and Ariely
(2009), and Lee (2009).
4An important exception is Dahl and Moretti (2008) and Almond and Edlund (2008), which we discuss below.
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specific case of adoptive children, our analysis is a step toward filling this gap.
Second, we analyze the determinants of successful matches. In fact, unmatched children enter
foster care, which is notoriously detrimental to their short- and long-term welfare.5 Despite the
social value of a well-functioning matching process that delivers suitable parents to every child,
adoption has not received much attention by the economics literature.6 Our analysis of parents’
preferences, combined with the identification of factors facilitating an ultimate match, opens the
door to policy interventions aimed at increasing the efficiency of this process.
The third contribution of the paper is, in fact, the evaluation of several recently implemented or
suggested regulatory policies. Specifically, we assess the potential effects of a ban on adoption by
same-sex parents (implemented in several states) on the volume of successful adoptions. We also
illustrate the potential reduction in adoptions of U.S.-born children by foreign parents due to the
recent ratification of the Hague Convention, which significantly toughened intercountry adoption,
starting in 2008.
We constructed our data set following the matching process managed online by an adoption
facilitator between 2004 and 2009. The data set is comprised of approximately 800 cases of either
born or unborn children that the facilitator collected from multiple agencies and posted on a website
designed for client PAPs. On the website, each baby is identified by a code, by an array of attributes,
by the adoption finalization costs, and by a set of restrictions imposed by the BMO specifying
which categories of PAPs she considers acceptable (such as straight couples, single-sex couples,
single women, and foreign PAPs).
Each PAP pays a fixed fee to the facilitator to enter this matching process. PAPs who participate
in the matching process observe the children available for adoption sequentially and can express
interest in any baby by submitting an application to the BMO (as long as they meet the BMO’s
requirements). Our data records all the PAPs that apply for each baby, as well as each BMO’s final
5Nearly 40% of youth exiting foster care are homeless within 18 months of discharge (U.S. General Accounting
Office, 1999). Entry into foster care is also associated with a much higher rate of incarceration. For instance, in
California, 70% of all penitentiary inmates have spent time in foster care (Select Committee Hearing of the California
Legislature, 2006).
6We discuss several exceptions in Section 1.2.
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choice, be it selecting an applicant PAP, matching through channels other than the facilitator, or
deciding to parent the child.
In order to elicit parents’ preferences directly from their behavior in the application process,
we need to account for the supply of children of different attributes. To that effect, we utilize a
decentralized search and matching model à-la Burdett and Coles (1997) and Eeckhout (1999). We
assume PAPs’ preferences depend on the observable attributes of the children they are matched
with, and BMOs’ preferences depend on PAPs’ attributes. Participants on both sides of the market
effectively solve an option value problem. In equilibrium, a PAP applies for a baby if the utility
associated with it exceeds a certain threshold (their reservation utility) and a BMO accepts a PAP’s
application if a match with that PAP yields a utility exceeding her own reservation utility. The
model enables us to estimate the preferences on each sides of the matching process separately. In
particular, we use our data to identify which children fall above and below the PAPs’ reservation
utilities, and subsequently to estimate PAPs’ marginal rates of substitution over children’s attributes
(gender, race, and time to birth) and adoption finalization costs.
We show that PAPs exhibit a preference in favor of girls and against African-American children.
Specifically, if we consider a non-African-American baby, the probability that a given PAP expresses
interest in such a baby is 11.5% if the baby is a girl and 7.9% if the baby is a boy. The effect of the
estimated adoption cost on child desirability is significant and negative. That is, ceteris paribus, an
increase in expected adoption costs lowers the desirability of a child. This allows us to convert the
gender preference into dollars. We find that the increase in desirability of a non-African-American
girl with respect to a non-African-American boy is equivalent to a $16, 000 decrease in adoption
finalization costs.
With regard to race, most children in our data are characterized by the composition of varying
percentages of three ethnicities: Caucasian, African-American, and Hispanic. If we consider an
unborn baby before the gender is known, the probability that a given PAP expresses interest in the
baby is about 13% if the baby is non-African-American and 1.7% if the baby is African-American.
Again, converting the racial preference into dollars, we find that the increase in desirability of a
non-African-American baby with respect to an African-American baby (both of unknown gender) is
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equivalent to at least a $38, 000 decrease in adoption finalization costs. However, we do not observe
any bias against Hispanic children, who represent a substantial fraction of the children in our data
set.
It is interesting to contemplate what underlies these observed preferences. Consider, first, the
gender preference. The existing literature on parents’ preferences for the gender of their biological
children has invariably identified a preference for boys. This is believed to be the case both within
the U.S. and abroad (e.g., as manifested in the case of the missing women in China). However,
our results on gender preferences constitute a reversal of this evidence in the adoption environment.
One possible explanation is that PAPs fear dysfunctional social behavior in adopted children and
perceive girls as “less risky” than boys in that respect.7
Consider, now, the racial preference. Homophily, defined as individuals’ preference for similar-
ity, is well-established in the sociological literature. In the adoption context, homophily can translate
into PAPs preferring adopted children that resemble them in looks, who can potentially pass as their
biological children. Given that the PAPs in our sample are predominantly Caucasian, the desire for
similarity is consistent with a preference for Caucasian children. While we suspect that this taste
for similarity is at the root of some of the racial preferences we observe, it cannot fully explain the
preferences we document. Indeed, to the extent that Hispanic children are more likely to appear
different from Caucasian PAPs relative to Caucasian children, homophily would suggest a (possibly
weaker) bias against Hispanic children as well. However, as highlighted above, this is not confirmed
by the data.
A natural concern pertains to the selection of participants on both sides into the matching process.
In particular, observed characteristics of children (such as gender and race) may signal important
health and behavioral attributes. Consequently, estimated PAPs’ preferences may simply reflect
their concerns regarding health and behavior. To address this, we look at the correlation between
7The lifetime probabilities of incarceration for men and for women were estimated at 11.3% and 1.8%, respectively,
by the Department of Justice (see http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm). Also, girls are less likely to develop
behavioral problems such as autism spectrum disorders (four times more prevalent in boys than in girls, according to the
Autism Society of America) or ADHD (diagnosed two to four times more frequently in boys; see Dulcan, 1997). These
facts can be regarded as support for the perceived higher risk boys entail.
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gender and race of the children in our data and an array of health and behavioral measures of the
BMOs. We find no significant difference in any of these measures across gender and race. If
anything, we find that African-American BMOs are characterized by slightly more desirable health
and behavioral markers. On the other side of the process, the preferences of the PAPs that select into
the facilitator’s operations may not be representative of the entire population of adoptive parents.
However, using the Census 2000 data, we find that the cases available through the facilitator end
up with adoptions of substantially more boys and African-American children relative to the average
adopting household in the U.S. This suggests that PAPs selecting into the facilitator’s client pool are
potentially more open to boys and African-American children.
We also estimate the extent to which PAPs’ preferences depend on their own characteristics. We
differentiate between PAPs according to whether they participate as a couple or as a single person,
their sexual orientation (heterosexual and same-sex couples), and their nationality (U.S. residents
and foreigners). We find that same-sex couples submit applications at nearly three times the rate of
straight ones. The preferences mentioned above hold true for all of these categories of PAPs. The
racial preference is stronger for same-sex couples and weaker for foreign PAPs.
Next, we quantify the variation of child desirability over the course of the BMO’s pregnancy and
after birth. The probability that a PAP is interested in an unborn child steadily increases the closer
the BMO is to delivery, with the probability of an application rising from 3.6% seven months before
birth to 8.6% a month before birth. This effect is presumably the outcome of two countervailing
forces. On the one hand, the earlier the match between the BMO and the PAP, the closer the adoptive
PAPs can monitor the BMO’s pre-natal care. On the other hand, BMOs cannot legally relinquish
their parental rights until after birth. This implies that BMOs who are closer to birth have less
opportunities to change their minds regarding the adoption and, thus, the match has a higher chance
of being successful. Our results suggest that the latter effect dominates the former.
We also find that the probability of a PAP applying for a baby drops substantially immediately
after birth. In terms of policy design, this highlights the importance of minimizing bureaucratic
obstacles that could disrupt an adoption plan that is in place at the time of birth.
On the normative side, the question of which parents are legitimate prospective adoptive parents
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(specifically, for the case of same-sex or single PAPs) is a topic of ongoing debate in the U.S. and
abroad. Internationally, The Hague Convention, originally crafted in 1993, regulates intercountry
adoption and was ratified in the U.S. on April 1, 2008. The Hague Convention has simultaneously
made international adoption far more difficult for U.S. citizens (potentially increasing demand for
domestic adoption) and domestic adoption virtually impossible for foreign PAPs. Consequently, its
merits are highly debated on both the domestic and international fronts.
Our analysis sheds light on some of these debates. Banning a certain category of PAPs from
the adoption process has two effects. First, it affects the volume of PAPs involved in the process,
and therefore the number of expected matches. Second, given the differential preferences across
PAPs’ categories, it changes the distribution of preferences among active PAPs and consequently
impacts the type of children that are adopted. For example, focusing on the effects of participation
of same-sex couples, we perform a natural counterfactual experiment. We shut down the possibility
for same-sex PAPs to submit applications to BMOs. This results in a 6% decrease in the probability
of being matched. We reach a similar conclusion when looking at whether adoption should be open
to foreign PAPs. If we ban foreign PAPs from our sample, we find a sizable reduction of 33% in the
chances that a baby will find a match. Furthermore, for both PAPs’ categories, there are significantly
more boys and African-American children within the lost matches.
1.2 Literature Review
Despite the scope of the adoption industry in terms of volume of children and annual revenues, as
well as the unique matching mechanisms it employs, adoption has, thus far, received little attention
in the economics literature.8 There are, however, a few important exceptions.
The paper that is closest to ours in terms of questions addressed is Bernal, Hu, Moriguchi, and
Nagypal (2007). This paper presents an historical analysis of domestic adoption, uncovering the
trends in different types of adoption: domestic and international, related and unrelated, as well
as standard adoption and foster care. At the individual level, the paper estimates the propensities
8See Fisher (2003) for an account of how adoption has also been overlooked by sociologists and social scientists
more generally.
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of PAPs to adopt and of BMOs to relinquish their child across time. These findings provide an
important springboard for our analysis, which takes PAPs’ and BMOs’ decisions to participate in
the adoption process as given and focuses on their behavior within that process.
From a policy perspective, Landes and Posner (1978) propose a strategy for amending the short-
age of children relinquished for domestic adoption and the abundance of children in foster care. They
suggest the opening of a market for children that would allow for equilibrating monetary transfers
between PAPs and BMOs. The envisioned market would entail little governmental regulation and
would remove adoption agencies’ monopolistic power. Our analysis is useful in assessing this pro-
posal, in that it identifies parents’ preferences that would feed into estimating efficiency and the
likelihood of entry to foster care in a fully decentralized mechanism as such.
Sacerdote (2002, 2007, 2009) makes use of adoption data to study questions regarding the im-
pacts of nature as opposed to nurture. In particular, he analyzes the long-term performance of
Korean-American adoptees who, as infants, were randomly assigned to families in the U.S. While
there exists a performance gap between biological and adopted children (favoring biological chil-
dren) in both education and income, there is no gap in the transmission of other habits (namely,
eating, drinking, and smoking). Björklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006) also focus on the long term
effects on both education and income of Swedish adoptees. They show that the adoptive father’s in-
come is the most significant determinant of the adoptee’s income, while the birth mother’s education
has the strongest effect on education performance.
The adoption industry has received attention in other disciplines, ranging from legal studies, to
sociology, psychology, and history. We provide a summary of the legal background of adoption in
Section 2 below. For detailed accounts of child adoption in the U.S., we refer the interested reader
to Melosh (2002), Pertman (2000), and references therein.
Other than the literature on adoption per se, our paper is linked to the work on two-sided match-
ing with frictions (e.g., Adachi, 2003; Burdett and Coles, 1997; Eeckhout, 1999; and Smith, 2006).
The underlying model in that literature has two sides of a market (e.g., workers and firms, men and
women, etc.) encountering each other randomly each period. During an encounter, the two par-
ties observe the utility the match would generate and jointly decide whether to pursue the match
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and leave the market, or to separate and wait for future periods. Equilibrium behavior is generally
characterized by threshold strategies, where each participant agrees to a match with someone who
is “good enough” from the other side of the market.
From a methodological point of view, our paper uses the underlying search and matching model
to estimate parents’ preferences. We know of very few other empirical estimations of two-sided
matching with frictions (see Abramitzky, Delavande, and Vasconcelos, 2009 and Botticini and Siow,
2008, Del Boca and Flinn, 2006, as well as some of the work on online dating discussed below).
The existing work focuses mainly on the marriage-market context. We note that the commitment
entailed in the successful conclusion of an adoption (that is arguably irreversible) makes our process
a particularly good fit for this class of models.
Gender and racial preferences are both common and well documented in many realms of mod-
ern society.9 Related to this paper, several recent papers have used matching environments of other
types, particularly the online dating market, to estimate racial preferences (e.g., Fisman, Iyengar,
Kamenica, and Simonson, 2006, 2008; and Hitch, Hortacsu, and Ariely, 2009). This work identi-
fies a preference for same-race partners, much in the spirit of the racial preferences we observe.10
Technically, adoption through facilitators and online dating are similar in that both involve a two-
sided search. However, unlike most online dating markets, in which an outcome is an agreement
for a rather preliminary contact, outcomes in the adoption environment are effectively binary and
irreversible: A match means a likely successful adoption. In terms of gender preferences, there is
a large body of work suggesting preferences for sons in the U.S. (see Dahl and Moretti, 2008; and
Almond and Edlund, 2008) and abroad (for instance, the case of the missing women in Asia, as
noted by Sen, 1990). Most of this work uses indirect indicators (e.g., separation rates of couples as
a function of their children’s gender) to assess these preferences. In this paper, we use the detailed
9There exists a large literature that corroborates gender and racial biases in the workplace (e.g., Altonji and Blank,
1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz, 2008; and Flabbi, 2009), in the health system
(Cooper-Patrick, Gallo, Gonzales, Vu, Powe, Nelson, and Ford, 1999), in the education system (Fryer and Levitt 2006;
Skiba, Michael, Nardo and Peterson, 2004), and in the justice system (Mustard, 2001; Iyengar, 2007, 2008). For
overviews, see Loury (2002) and Nelson (2009).
10See also Banerjee, Duflo, Ghatak and Lafortune (2009) for an empirical analysis of the arranged marriage market
in India. They document strong preferences for within-caste marriages, similar to the preferences for same-race partners
unearthed by the online dating literature.
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matching data to estimate parents’ preferences over children’s attributes directly, and we identify a
substantial preference for girls in the adoption context.
2 Institutional Environment
2.1 The Adoption Process in the U.S.
Adoption is an ancient institution.11 The concept of adoption, however, was not legally recognized
in the United States until 1851, with the enactment of The Massachusetts Adoption of Children Act,
widely considered the first “modern” adoption law. Prior to the 20th century, court adoptions were
very rare. During the 20th century, formal adoptions increased dramatically in the U.S., reaching a
numerical peak by 1970, when 175,000 adoptions were finalized. This increase went hand in hand
with a variety of reforms dedicated to the provision of adopted children with legal safeguards en-
forced by certified agencies. In 1917, Minnesota passed the first state law that required children and
adults to be investigated and adoption records to be shielded from public view. By mid-century, vir-
tually all U.S. states had revised their laws to incorporate such minimum standards as pre-placement
investigations, post-placement probation, and sealed records of the adoption process. Since 1950, a
number of major shifts have occurred. First, the definition of adoptable children was expanded to in-
clude older, disabled, non-Caucasian, and special-needs children. Second, a variety of reforms have
been introduced to encourage open adoptions, which allow adoptees and birth parents to remain in
contact.
In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created The Uni-
form Adoption Act as an attempt to codify and make current legal practice uniform across states.
Nonetheless, very few states altered jurisdiction to incorporate the Uniform Adoption Act and states
still differ with respect to an assortment of details regarding the legal formalization of adopted kin-
ship. In what follows, we summarize the main elements of the adoption process in the U.S. (see
Jasper, 2008 or Mabrey, 2006 for a full state-by-state survey of adoption jurisdiction).
The supply side of domestic adoption is represented by a population of BMOs who intend to re-
11Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, and Babylonians, all had adoption systems.
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linquish their children for adoption. The children can be either born or unborn. When not searching
for adoptive parents on her own, the BMO looks for (or is located by) an adoption agency or some
other organization in order to be matched with PAPs.12 Adoption agencies can be either private or
public. While public adoption agencies typically specialize in special-needs children, private agen-
cies match all types of children, and can be either non-profit or for-profit organizations, depending
on state law.13
The demand side of domestic adoption consists of PAPs. These PAPs can be either (straight or
same-sex) couples or singles, and either U.S. or foreign citizens. After undergoing a certification
based on a home study, the first choice that PAPs seeking to adopt face is whether to participate
in either the international or the domestic adoption process, or in both.14 The PAPs who decide
to search for a child domestically can use adoption agencies, pursue a private (or “independent”)
adoption with the aid of specialized attorneys, or advertise in local magazines and newsletters.
Each of these channels can be problematic from the PAPs’ point of view. Since adoption agencies
often operate in geographical areas where they can easily locate BMOs, or where they are subject to
less regulation, it can be difficult for PAPs (who usually reside in cities and high-income areas) to
locate, screen, and interact with many agencies at the same time. Moreover, in many states, the law
does not allow adoption attorneys to act as intermediaries in adoption matches. Finally, independent
search through advertising is time-consuming and may entail significant cost uncertainty.
These considerations created a role for intermediaries, usually referred to as “adoption facilita-
tors.” Much like adoption agencies, the role of facilitators is regulated by state laws, and in some
states their activity is restricted.15 Often operating online, adoption facilitators connect with BMOs
from multiple agencies and coordinate the matching process with PAPs.
12If the child is already born, the BMO can immediately relinquish her parental rights (legal custody of the child) to
the agency, and forego her participation in the selection of the adoptive parents.
13Some agencies are faith-based and give priority to families from a particular religious background.
14These two adoption routes entail several trade-offs. While costs are comparable, international adoption is subject to
the restrictions of the Hague Convention (see Section 2.3 below), as well as to the laws of the child’s country of origin.
Children adopted internationally are typically older than those adopted domestically, and the wait to adopt them has
been reported to be longer (see http://www.americanadoptions.com).
15In fact, only in very few states, such as California and Pennsylvania, can adoption facilitators be legally paid (see,
e.g., California Family Code Sections 8623-8638, Chapter 1.5).
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Once a PAP is matched with a child, the ensuing process depends on whether the child is born
or not. If the BMO of an already born child has not yet relinquished her parental rights to an agency,
then she can relinquish them as soon as the match occurs. The child is then put in the custody of the
PAP. If, instead, the baby is unborn, the parties wait until birth, with no commitment to complete
the adoption on either side. During this time, the PAP normally pays the living and the medical
expenses of the BMO. At birth, with a lag determined by state law, the BMO can, if she still desires,
relinquish her parental rights. In this case, the child is placed in the custody of the PAP.
This initiates the post-placement process. The adoption is finalized when a court transfers the
parental rights to the PAP. The finalization is conditional on a series of legal requirements determined
by the state. The court bases its decision on a post-placement report completed by a registered social
worker on the basis of some visits to the adopting family. The court also screens the nature of the
financial transfers that have taken place between the PAP and the BMO, as well as the transfers that
the PAP has made to the adoption agency. In particular, the court checks that transfers to the BMO
constitute allowed reimbursements of either living or medical expenses.16 Successful PAPs can then
file for an adoption tax credit that effectively reduces the cost of adoption by a fixed amount.17
2.2 Gay, Lesbian, and Single Adoption
Adoption by gay and lesbian couples or individuals is premitted in only a few countries around the
world.18 In the U.S., many states have enacted or attempted to enact legislation on gay and lesbian
adoption since the early 2000s. However, state laws are still largely silent on the issue. While some
states restrict adoption by sexual orientation or marital status, legislation with respect to this issue is
still in flux, and gay and lesbian adoption is the subject of a very active and heated policy debate.
At the time of writing of this paper, only Arkansas, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hamp-
16Any transfer from the PAP to the BMO that is aimed to obtain consensus of the adoption is illegal. State laws
specify the precise categories of BMO expenses (such as medical, legal, and living costs) that can be covered by PAPs,
which are classified as charity. If the BMO changes her mind regarding the adoption before finalization, all transfers are
generally non-reimbursable.
17For 2008, the maximal adoption credit was $11,650; see IRS Form 8839, Qualified Adoption Expenses.
18Besides the U.S., these are Andorra, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Guam, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and two states in Australia.
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shire, and Utah imposed restrictions on gay and lesbian adoption.19 Nonetheless, in many states in
which statutes do not prohibit adoption by gay men and lesbians, individual judges or courts have
ruled against the practice. In fact, in 40 states, Statute or Appellate Court rulings have banned joint
adoption by same-sex couples.20
The Census 2000 indicated that 4% of all adopted children in the U.S. live in a gay or lesbian
household. Even though in 2000 the adoption rate of same-sex households was reported as 1.6%,
this rate has the potential to increase dramatically if the current restrictions are lifted.21
Since the early 90s, there has been an increase in the number of adoptions by single individuals,
the vast majority of whom are women. By 2000, singles accounted for at least 15% of all adoptive
parents in the U.S. (see the Census 2000). While allowed in the U.S., adoption by local or foreign
single individuals is prohibited in the majority of countries all over the world.
2.3 The Hague Convention
Intercountry adoptions have played an important role over the years. The percentage of intercountry
adoptions (out of all adoptions) fluctuated between 4% and 9% between the 80s and the mid 90s and
rose to a documented 15% in 2001 (see Bernal, Hu, Moriguchi, and Nagypal, 2007).
A critical development in international adoption law and practice was the enactment of the 1993
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption
(hereafter, “The Hague Convention”).22 The Hague Convention was ratified in the U.S. on April
1, 2008, at which time 74 other nations had already signed, ratified, or acceded it. The primary
principles of The Hague Convention are targeted at ensuring that each adoption is in the best interests
of the child and at preventing the abduction, sale, or trafficking of children between countries. Most
19Arkansas and Utah, while not explicitely banning gay and lesbian adoption, prohibit adoption by a couple that is
not legally married. At the same time, in these states it is legal for single individuals to adopt, regardless of sexual
orientation, so long as they are not co-habitating in non-marital relationships. Historically, Florida has been the only
state that had explicitely banned adoption by a gay or lesbian single individual. This ban was ruled unconstitutional in
November 2008.
20For details regarding states’ jurisdiction on gay and lesbian adoption, see American Civil Liberties Foundation
(2006), Human Rights Campaign (2009), and National Conference of State Legislatures (2009).
21See Badget, Chambers, Gates, and Macomber (2007).
22The Hague Convention is available through http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=69
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notably, the treaty requires that: (i) Agencies involved in intercountry adoption, in both the sending
and receiving country, be certified by government agencies; (ii) Agencies provide proof of effort
to place the child for adoption in their country of origin by advertising the case prior to matching
the child with foreign PAPs; and (iii) The baby remains in foster care in the country of origin for a
minimal amount of time before full custody is granted to the selected PAP.
There are two channels through which The Hague Convention may affect U.S. domestic adop-
tion. First, the high costs associated with agency certification and advertising have reduced the
number of agencies, in both the U.S. and abroad, that can legally send foreign children to the U.S.
This can potentially increase both the costs and the waiting times to adopt a foreign child. As a
result, the demand for domestic children is expected to increase.
Second, prior to the ratification of The Hague Convention, foreign PAPs could adopt U.S.-born
children in much the same way U.S. residents do. Since the adoption process in European countries
and Canada is often slower and more centralized than in the U.S., foreign PAPs constituted a non-
trivial portion of the demand for domestic children.23 The increased regulation due to The Hague
Convention is expected to dramatically slow down the adoption of U.S. children by foreign PAPs.24
Government agencies took notice of these problems and modified some regulatory aspects of the
The Hague Convention in March 2009.25
23For instance, data from the Canadian immigration bureau indicates that 399 American children aged 0 to 21 were
adopted by Canadian citizens between 1994 and 1998.
24Private consultations with adoption experts suggested that, as of April 2009 (one full year after the Hague convention
was ratified), only one foreign PAP completed an adoption process in the U.S. Unfortunately, there are very limited solid
data documenting adoption of U.S. children from abroad as there is no agency tracking issuance of U.S. passports to
infants, nor any organization tracking visa applications for U.S. infants moving abroad for adoptive placement.
25In particular, if the BMO herself identifies a suitable foreign PAP, the agency’s burden to show effort in recruiting a
U.S. citizen as PAP was lifted (see http://adoption.state.gov on 22 CFR 96.54(a)).
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3 The Data
3.1 The Facilitator’s Operations
We constructed our data set monitoring an online adoption facilitator who mediates between agen-
cies dealing with BMOs and PAPs, over the period from June 2004 to August 2009.26 Over a five
year period, we collected data on the applications of 675 PAPs to more than 800 BMOs. The facili-
tator placed 115 children, while 504 were placed through other channels.
New cases of unborn children or already-born children available for adoption are posted on the
facilitator’s publicly accessible website regularly.27 Activity on the website follows this basic timing:
1. An unborn baby, or already-born child, is posted as a new case on the facilitator’s web-
site. The child is identified by the BMO’s code name.28 For every case, the facilitator publishes
the following information: (a) The baby’s characteristics: date on which the case is presented, race
composition, gender (when available), due date for unborn children, and age for already-born chil-
dren;29 (b) the costs of adopting the child. These include a fixed facilitator fee, adoption agency
fees, BMO’s expenses (that may include living and medical costs), and legal fees; and (c) the con-
straints that the BMO or the adoption agency impose on PAPs. Specifically, the BMO can restrict
the availability of her baby from same-sex, single, foreign PAPs, etc.30
2. After paying the fixed fee to the facilitator, a PAP can submit one or more applications to
adopt any of the available children at no additional cost.31 As PAPs submit an application to a
26See the Data Appendix, available at: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~lyariv/Papers/Adoption_Data_Appendix.pdf, for
detailed information on the construction of the data set.
27On any given day, there are on average 23 BMOs on the website, all listed on the same page. This makes it
straightforward for PAPs to browse the entire list of available BMOs.
28The facilitator modifies or changes the BMOs’ real first names to maintain their anonymity.
29The website also reports fetus anomalies detected by an ultrasound or other documented health problems. However,
these medical issues occur for only 0.2% of the children in our data set.
30There are some additional restrictions on the PAPs’ characteristics dictated by state laws or special adoption regula-
tions that are relevant for some cases. For example, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 gives Native American Indian
Nations and Tribes the right to control adoptions that involve their tribal members’s children. As a result, the adoption
of these children is often restricted to Native American PAPs only. In addition, the BMO can also express her preference
toward an open adoption. In our sample, in only 2% of cases did the BMO specify a preference regarding a closed as
opposed to an open adoption.
31In some cases, before applying, the PAPs receive additional information regarding the BMO and the child based on
an interview the agency conducts with the BMO. This interview comprises questions regarding the BMO’s health and
life-style, her family and the birth-father characteristics. While the information posted on the website is verifiable by
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BMO, their first name (or initials) are posted on that child’s case. The PAPs’ application consists
of a letter to the BMO sent through the facilitator and the agency. In this letter, the PAPs describe
themselves, their life-style, and how they plan to raise the child.32
3. The posted cases can be resolved in several ways: (a) the BMO chooses the desired PAP
among the applicants.33 This results in a match observable on the website, and both the BMO and
the PAP leave the website;34 (b) the BMO is matched through a different channel, and the child is
reported as “matched” on the website; (c) the BMO decides to parent, and the decision is reported
on the website; (d) the facilitator reports a lost contact with the BMO; or (e) there are no applications
for the case.35 This final outcome sometimes leads the BMO to parent, but in most cases the child
remains unmatched. Unmatched children enter the foster-care system, where they remain adoptable
until the age of 18.
The entire process, from posting of a BMO on the website to finding a match with a PAP, is very
fast. Most PAP applications are submitted within the first 10 days from when a child information is
first posted, and the median child is available on the website for less than a month.
3.2 Summary Statistics
3.2.1 Birth Mothers’ Statistics
Table 1, below, reports the summary statistics pertaining to children’s attributes in our data, while
the summary statistics conditional on a match and the time trends of some of the children’s attributes
appear in Tables 6 and 7, respectively, in the Appendix.36
The main categories of attributes that prove most useful for our analysis are: gender, race,
the agency and the facilitator, this additional information is not verifiable.
32The letter often includes photos of the PAPs, their family, and their environment. No other contact between BMO
and PAPs is permitted prior to a match.
33If the child is born and the BMO has already relinquished her parental rights, the adoption agency that has legal
custody of the child selects the PAP.
34Any active application of that PAP for other children is dropped. In fact, the facilitator’s policy specifies that
if the selected PAPs reject a match, they will not be allowed any further applications through the facilitator. Thus,
applications are binding from the PAPs’ point of view. The BMO stops receiving applications from other PAPs upon a
match. However, she can still decide to parent until she relinquishes parental rights.
35If no application is received after a wait of about one month, the facilitator usually reports the case as “closed.”
36Summary statistics correspond to different numbers of observations since, in some data points, not all attributes
were relevant or specified.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Already Born 0.273 0.445 0 1 801
Months to Birth for Unborn 1.925 1.62 0.033 7.8 579
Months from Birth for Born 1.176 5.63 0.033 69.5 370
Days from First to Last Application 33.84 31.19 1 511 745
Days from Presentation on Site to Last Day on Site 51.04 42.18 1 511 804
Days on Site if Always Born 33.84 25.50 1 131 125
Days on Site if Always Unborn 53.67 38.25 1 217 477
Days on Site if Switch from Unborn to Born 85.55 53.17 3 240 138
Number of Interested PAPs 2.218 2.216 0 15 804
Applications Per Day 0.119 0.249 0 4 745
Bad Health Words 0.002 0.050 0 1 803
Single PAP Allowed 0.66 0.474 0 1 803
Same-Sex PAP Allowed 0.313 0.464 0 1 803
Foreign PAP Allowed 0.856 0.351 0 1 803
Girl 0.223 0.416 0 1 803
Boy 0.306 0.461 0 1 803
Caucasian 0.361 0.393 0 1 804
Hispanic 0.128 0.27 0 1 804
Asian 0.022 0.112 0 1 804
Non-African-American Boy 0.175 0.35 0 1 803
Non-African-American Girl 0.12 0.302 0 1 803
African-American 0.389 0.415 0 1 804
African-American Girl 0.102 0.279 0 1 803
African-American Boy 0.13 0.301 0 1 803
Domestic Finalization Cost 26290 8176 3500 52300 778
Table 1: Summary Statistics for BMOs
whether children have already been born or are unborn, the time period between presentation date
and birth for unborn children, adoption finalization costs, and the restrictions imposed by the BMOs
on the acceptable PAPs.
In terms of gender, not conditioning on the achievement of a match, 22.3% of the children in
our sample are girls, 30.6% are boys, and the rest are of unknown gender. Conditioning on a match
being created (either through the facilitator or through other channels), girls account for 28.8% of
matched children, while boys account for 24.2%.
As for race, the unconditional breakdown in our data set is 36.1% Caucasian, 38.9% African-
American, and 12.8% Hispanic. The race breakdown conditional on children finding a match is
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37.5% Caucasian, 38.7% African-American, and 14.3% Hispanic.37
Already-born children constitute 27.3% of our data set, while, conditional on being unborn, the
average time to birth at which the cases are presented to the facilitator is slightly below two months.
The average age of already-born children is just above one month. Conditional on being matched,
already-born children constitute only 11.1% of all matched children.
In terms of PAPs who are acceptable to BMOs, same-sex PAPs are allowed in 31.3% of the
cases, foreign PAPs in 85.6% of the cases, and single women in 66% of the cases.38
Finally, the costs to finalize an adoption range from $3, 500 to $52, 300, in addition to the $4, 800
fixed fee for working with the facilitator. The adoption finalization costs include several components.
First, they contain the BMO’s reimbursable expenses until birth, which can include rent, food, and
medical costs. As discussed above, these expenses are restricted by state law. Second, the adoption
finalization costs contain agency and legal fees. Typically these fee are less regulated than the
BMO’s expenses.39
In terms of the outcomes of the matching process, the average number of PAPs who apply for a
given child is 2.2, varying from 0 to 15. BMOs decide to parent their child in 5.3% of the cases, are
reported as a lost contact in 5% of the cases, and as a closed case in 25.2% of cases. A match occurs
in 70% of the cases (13.5% through the facilitator). The average number of days a case remains on
the facilitator’s website is 45 days, ranging from 1 to 469 days.
3.2.2 Prospective Adoptive Parents’ Statistics
We now turn to the demand side, represented by the PAPs. The summary statistics on the PAPs’
attributes are in Table 2 below, while the summary statistics conditional on a match and the time
37The sample of children posted on the facilitator’s website is potentially biased with respect to the general population
of adopted children. However, because states are not legally required to report the number of domestic adoptions, there
are limited solid sources documenting characteristics of adopted kinships. The Census 2000 is the most recent source,
according to which the breakdown of U.S.-born adopted children under the age of 10 is 54% female, and 18% African-
American.
38There are very few cases in which lesbian PAPs are allowed to apply and gay men are not, or vice-versa. The
variable ‘Same-sex Allowed’ identifies a baby for which at least one of these PAP categories is considered acceptable.
39Some states regulate agencies’ and facilitators’ fees. Usually, the only restriction is that they do not exceed the
customary levels in that state (see Jasper, 2008).
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trends of some of the PAPs’ attributes are in Table 7 in the Appendix.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Applies for a Baby (on a Specific Day) 0.053 0.047 0 0.501 675
Applies for a Baby (Allowed Choices only) 0.064 0.094 0 1 670
Applies for a Baby (at Some Point in Time) 0.060 0.058 0 0.504 675
Days between First and Last Application 103 171 1 1559 675
Days Since Last Application for a PAP 1.643 4.852 0 94.149 673
Gay PAP (Score) 0.064 0.218 0 1 613
Lesbian PAP (Score) 0.065 0.222 0 1 612
Foreign PAP (Score) 0.516 0.165 0.001 0.999 674
Single PAP (Score) 0.083 0.271 0 1 613
Gay PAP (Unambiguous) 0.046 0.209 0 1 675
Lesbian PAP (Unambiguous) 0.047 0.213 0 1 675
Straight PAP (Unambiguous) 0.633 0.482 0 1 675
Ambiguous PAP Name 0.201 0.401 0 1 675
Table 2: Summary Statistics for PAPs
Recall that when a PAP applies for a specific baby, only the PAP’s first name(s) appear on the
website next to the baby requested. We therefore infer PAPs’ characteristics based on their names
and on their behavior on the website. As a first step, when the PAP consists of one person, we
identify that PAP as a single woman.40 Second, when the PAPs’ names unequivocally indicate that
the PAP is a straight couple, or a same-sex couple, we assign the relevant attribute to the PAP.41
Of the PAPs that have names with unambiguous gender classification, 63.3% are straight couples,
4.6% are gay men, 4.7% are lesbians, and 8.3% are single women. We use these priors to construct
straight, gay, and lesbian scores for PAPs with names entailing some gender ambiguity.42
As for foreign PAPs, we infer their identities from their behavior on the website. Specifically,
assuming a symmetric prior, we compute the probability of a PAP being foreign using Bayesian
updating over a multinomial process.43
40According to an interview with the owner of the website, there are no single men among the PAPs.
41For the sake of robustness, we replicated all of our results using these unambiguous classifications.
42For instance, ‘jack&jamie’ could be either a straight or a gay men couple and are coded with the corresponding
posterior of 0.92 = 0.6330.633+0.046 that they are a straight couple as their “Straight PAP” score and with the complementary
posterior of 0.08 as their “Gay PAP” score. Similarly, ‘kim&jamie’ is coded with a 0.85 “Straight PAP” score, a 0.07
“Gay PAP” score, and a 0.08 “Lesbian PAP” score.
43Given a 50-50 division between foreign and domestic PAPs, we assume a 10% error-probability for foreign PAPs
applying for children for whom they are not allowed to apply. We compute the posterior probability of the PAP being
foreign (see the Data Appendix for more details on the construction of the ‘Foreign PAP’ score).
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According to this classification criterion, 78.8% of the PAPs in our sample are straight couples,
6.4% are gay couples, 6.5% are lesbian couples, and 8.3% are single women. In addition, 51.6% of
the PAPs are foreign.
We consider a PAP active from the time at which the PAP submits the first application until the
PAP is reported as “matched” or, if never reported as such, until ten days after the last application is
submitted.44 Given these assumptions, active PAPs apply for a child for which they are acceptable
with a 6.4% probability.
The average time elapsed between the PAPs’ first and last application is 103 days. The (average)
application probability of a PAP for an available baby on each day is 5.3%, while the probability of
applying for that baby at some point is 6%.45
Finally, the composition of PAPs has been fluctuating somewhat over the years. Most notably, the
fraction of foreign PAPs, which varied between 57.5% and 60.3% between 2004 and 2007, dropped
to 50.3% in 2008 and to 37.4% in 2009, possibly reflecting the impact of the Hague Convention.
4 A Model of Matching with Search
In our environment, PAPs search for a BMO to be matched with, while BMOs search for a PAP to
relinquish their baby to. Therefore, we estimate a sequential two-sided matching model. The model
has two important implications for our estimation strategy. First, it allows us to assess preferences
for each side of the matching process separately. Second, it enables us to evaluate marginal rates
of substitution over attributes of parents and children when only a slice of the market is being ob-
served. The latter point is particularly important in view of the fact that some PAPs may be utilizing
multiple adoption channels and, likewise, some BMOs may pursue several paths when considering
relinquishing their child.46 In this section, we present the basic structure of the model (which is
44We provide robustness checks for our results with respect to the length of this window.
45For instance, consider a PAP who is active for 20 days and a BMO who is available over that entire period. Suppose
the PAP applies for the baby on day 11 (so that the PAP has an open application to the BMO from day 11 to day 20)
Then, the (average) application probability on each day is 50% while the probability of applying at some point in time
is 100%.
46However, the model does not allow for adverse selection into the matching process by either side (PAPs or BMOs).
This is validated empirically in Subsection 5.5 below.
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closely related to Burdett and Coles, 1997 and Eeckhout, 1999) and characterize its equilibrium
structure.
4.1 Underlying Framework
In our data set, we observe several types of PAPs: straight couples, gay men, lesbian couples, single
women, and foreign couples. These PAPs’ types may have dissimilar preferences over children’s
attributes and may impact the BMOs’ utilities differently. Formally, each type is characterized by
a vector of attributes and denoted by θ = (θ1, . . . , θh) ∈ ΘPAP . BMOs may care about other PAP
attributes that need not affect PAPs’ preferences (e.g., wealth and looks). We capture such additional
attributes by a = (a1, ..., am) ∈ APAP . We assume that (θ, a) is determined independently and
identically across PAPs, with a joint cumulative distribution FPAP .
We assume that each BMO is characterized by the child’s attributes c = (c1, ..., cn) ∈ CBMO
(capturing the child’s race, gender, time to birth, and so on). Attributes are independently and
identically distributed across BMOs with a cumulative distribution FBMO. Each BMO is also char-
acterized by the set of types she is willing to consider Θ ⊆ ΘPAP (such as straight couples, U.S.
residents, etc). These are determined independently of the child’s attributes and of the set of types
other BMOs are willing to consider according to the cumulative distribution HBMO.47
4.1.1 Prospective Adoptive Parents
A PAP of type θ ∈ ΘPAP gains a match utility uPAP (θ; c) from adopting a child with attributes c.
We normalize the utility from remaining unmatched to zero, while we assume that the utility from
adopting any child is non-negative: uPAP (θ; c) ≥ 0 for all c and strictly positive for some c. This
amounts to assuming that the outside option (not pursuing adoption or pursuing it through a different
channel) is worse than the adoption of any child on the website.
47Acceptable categories of PAPs are arguably due to upbringing and ideological convictions that go beyond strategic
forces in the matching process we study. We therefore assume that acceptable categories of PAPs are exogenous and
independent of the child’s characteristics. Empirically, the most significant restriction imposed by BMOs in our data
is whether they allow applications from same-sex couples and from foreign PAPs. However, none of the observable
characteristics of children explains these restrictions (see Table 12 in the Appendix). Having said that, the model would
extend directly to a situation in which the BMOs’ attributes do affect these limitations.
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PAPs have an arrival rate of λ. Each PAP experiences a discount factor of δPAP . This discount
rate can be thought of as capturing PAPs’ fatigue or aging.
4.1.2 Birth Mothers
Each BMO gains a match utility uBMO(θ, a) from giving up her child to a PAP with attributes
(θ, a).48 We normalize the BMO’s utility from being unmatched to zero and assume that uBMO(θ, a) >
0 for some PAP attributes (θ, a).49
A note on the modeling asymmetry we impose between the BMOs and PAPs is now in order.
In principle, some of the BMOs’ attributes could play a role in both the BMOs’ and the PAPs’
preferences. Empirically, however, this does not seem to be the case – BMOs’ observable decisions
do not seem to differ across child attributes (we return to this point in Section 6 below).
BMOs have an arrival rate of γ and experience a discount factor of δBMO. This discount fac-
tor can be interpreted as the forgone monetary flow that birth mothers give up by not committing
immediately to a match.50
4.1.3 The Dynamic Matching Process
Upon arrival in the matching process, a PAP of type θ may or may not submit an application to each
BMO that enters the process and allows applications from PAPs of type θ.
As described above, an application involves a letter from the PAP to the BMO. This letter is
effectively comprised of two elements: the type θ of the PAP submitting the application and a noisy
signal α of the PAP’s remaining attributes a (the letter could suggest certain characteristics to BMOs,
such as affluence, warmth, etc., but may not accurately describe the vector a of attributes the BMO
may be interested in). That is, the BMO observes an application of the form (θ, α), where we assume
48As described above, in certain cases, an adoption agency has physical custody of the child. We assume that adoption
agencies perceive the best interest of the child in alignment with the BMO’s preferences, and so this does not affect our
analysis.
49In general, uBMO(θ, a) may be negative. This allows some mothers to decide during the matching process to
mother the child or use alternative routes for adoption.
50We assume that BMOs’ discount factor does not depend on the child’s attribute, not even on the time to birth,
despite it being correlated with the time on the site (see discussion in Section 6). Table 1 implies a case resolution that
is very quick (around one month). This short time interval suggests that decisions of BMOs do not change dramatically
over their duration on the site, making the uniformity of the discount factor an arguably weak assumption.
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that the signal α has full support (of APAP ) and denote by GPAP (α|a) its conditional distribution.
We denote by UBMO(θ, α) = EGPAP {uBMO(θ, a)|α} the BMO’s expected utility associated with
the application (θ, α). We assume that the parameters of the model are common knowledge among
all participants.51
A BMO who receives an application immediately decides whether to accept it or reject it.52
When an application is accepted, the match gets irreversibly formed and the corresponding PAP and
BMO exit the process. Otherwise, both the PAP and the BMO stay in the matching process.
4.2 Equilibrium Characterization
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibrium behavior of PAPs and BMOs. Notice, first, that
we can restrict attention to stationary reservation utility strategies for both PAPs and BMOs.53
In equilibrium, each PAP of type θ and attributes a has a reservation utility u¯PAP (θ, a). That is,
upon considering a BMO i with a set Θi of acceptable PAPs’ types and with child’s attributes c, a
PAP of type θ ∈ Θi submits an application if and only if uPAP (θ; c) ≥ u¯PAP (θ, a).
Similarly, each BMO i with acceptable types Θi and a child of attributes c has a reservation
utility u¯BMO(Θi, c). Upon considering an application (θ, α) from a PAP of type θ ∈ Θi, the BMO
will accept the application if and only if UBMO (θ, α) ≥ u¯BMO(Θi, c).
Given thresholds {u¯PAP (θ, a)}θ∈Θ,a∈APAP and {u¯BMO(Θ, c)}Θ⊆ΘPAP ,c∈C , the arrival rates λ, γ,
together with the distributions FPAP , GPAP , FBMO, and HBMO, each PAP of type θ and attributes a
faces an equilibrium arrival rate rθ,a of BMOs’ acceptances, and an equilibrium distribution of these
BMOs’ attributes φθ,a. Similarly, a BMO of type Θ with a child of attributes c faces an arrival rate
51In particular, this implies that no learning about the market per se is taking place. This is consistent with our
empirical observations – we do not identify differences in PAPs’ and BMOs’ behavior across time.
52The assumption that agents consider potential matches one at a time is standard in the literature on bilateral search
(see Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright, 2005). Technically, it dramatically simplifies the equilibrium characterization of our
model. In particular, it implies that a PAP’s decision whether to send an application out does not depend on the number
and identity of the other PAPs interested in the same child. The justification for this assumption is in the monetary flow
the BMO forgoes by not making an immediate decision paired with the relatively short interval of time that a BMO
spends in the matching process.
53As highlighted in Burdett and Coles (1997), this model can lead to multiple equilibria. We could impose regularity
conditions on uPAP and uBMO that would guarantee uniqueness (mirroring, for example, the structure imposed by
Eeckhout, 1999). However, since all equilibria are characterized by reservation strategies, such additional assumptions
are not necessary for the purpose of our estimations.
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of applications sΘ,c and an equilibrium distribution of these PAPs’ attributes ψΘ,c.54
Denote by VPAP (θ; c) the continuation value of a type θ PAP considering a BMO whose child
has attributes c. The following Bellman equation corresponds to the PAP’s optimization problem:
VPAP (θ; c) = max
{
uPAP (θ; c) , δPAPErθ,a,φθ,aVPAP (θ; c
′)
}
.
The solution to this problem is the reservation utility u¯PAP (θ, a) such that:
u¯PAP (θ, a) = δPAP Erθ,a,φθ,aVPAP (θ; c
′) .
or
u¯PAP (θ, a) =
1
1− δPAP Erθ,a,φθ,a [uPAP (θ; c) | uPAP (θ; c) ≥ u¯PAP (θ, a)] (1)
A similar analysis applies to the BMOs’ behavior. The reservation utility of a BMO is then:
u¯BMO(Θ, c) =
1
1− δBMOEsΘ,c,ψΘ,c [UBMO (θ, α) | UBMO (θ, α) ≥ u¯BMO(Θ, c)] (2)
Equations (1) and (2) fully characterize an equilibrium of this model.55
We conclude with two remarks. First, although we assumed that PAPs get positive utility from
adopting any child on the website, in equilibrium, their reservation utility may be above the utility
of adopting some of these children. Thus, in equilibrium, some BMOs may not find a suitable PAP.
Second, note that our data describe the operation of one adoption facilitator, while the PAPs
and BMOs may take part in parallel matching processes through other channels (e.g., religious
organizations, private attorneys, etc.). Thus, it is inherently difficult for us to identify the arrival and
departure rates of PAPs and BMOs together with utilities corresponding to all types of participants.
However, the arrival and departure rates do not affect the marginal rates of substitution given by the
underlying preferences of participants. Therefore, our approach of using the information on whether
54We are essentially characterizing a partial equilibrium of this environment in that the distributions over characteris-
tics are assumed exogenous. As discussed in Burdett and Coles (1999), this can be viewed as a full equilibrium if one
assumes the appearance of ‘clones’ of agents who leave the market. Alternatively, under simple regularity assumptions,
one can show that, in fact, there exist distributions constituting part of a full equilibrium. However, we stress that the
key insight for our estimations is the equilibrium use of threshold strategies.
55Note that the particular structure of the noise in our model assures that PAPs who submit an application are never
indifferent between applying and not applying.
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PAPs and BMOs fall above or below each other’s reservation utility in order to make inferences on
the relative importance of different children’s and PAPs’ characteristics is valid even when other
channels are being utilized by either side.
5 Estimating Adoptive Parents’ Preferences
This section presents our estimations regarding PAPs’ preferences. We are interested in studying
PAPs’ preferences over gender, race, time to birth, and costs. Since many adoption-policy debates
revolve around the participation of special categories of PAPs (such as same-sex couples, singles,
and foreign PAPs), we analyze how the preferences with respect to children’s attributes vary across
these categories. This will allow us to examine how a participation ban on specific categories of
PAPs would affect outcomes.
An observation in our sample corresponds to a triplet (t, b, p) , where t identifies a date, b a baby
who is unmatched on the website at date t, and p a PAP that is active on the website at time t and for
whom b is an available choice – that is, b’s BMO did not exclude the type of PAP p upon entering
the matching process. Recall that we consider a PAP active from the time at which the PAP submits
the first application until the PAP is reported as “matched” or, if it is never reported as such, until
ten days after the last application is submitted.56
The model of Section 4 implies that a baby receives an application from a PAP if and only if
the PAP’s utility from being matched with that baby exceeds the PAP’s reservation utility. For the
sake of estimation, we consider a stochastic version of the model above and assume that each PAP
of type θ assesses the utility from a child of characteristics c as
uPAP (θ; c) = βθ · c+ βθ,0 + εtbp ≥ uPAP (θ), (3)
where βθ,0 is a constant term that varies with PAP’s type and year, and εtbp is an idiosyncratic
56In principle, the window of activity is important for our estimations as we assume that active PAPs who do not
apply for available babies value them below their threshold. In the Appendix, we discuss the robustness of our results
to a window of 90 days (Table 8). Also, Table 9 illustrates results obtained looking at the decision of a PAP to apply
to a BMO without including the time variation t. These alternative definitions of PAP activity do not have a noticeable
impact on our results.
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unobservable distributed according to the standard normal distribution (corresponding to each triplet
(t, b, p)).57
The specification allows us to estimate discrete choice models in which the probability of ap-
plying for a match with a specific child depends on the child’s observable attributes. Note that this
method enables us to evaluate the weights that different types of PAPs put on different attributes.
However, it does not allow us to identify the absolute level of the reservation utility corresponding
to (1), as it is confounded with the constant term in the utility specification.
The model is useful in two respects. First, it provides a justification for these estimations. In
particular, it validates the separate estimation of PAPs’ and BMOs’ preferences (rather than the
estimation of a simultaneous set of equations capturing the demand and supply of children, which
would have emerged from a static model). Second, it links the estimated constant term with an
endogenous reservation utility (in addition to a constant associated with the parents’ utility function),
affecting its interpretation. In principle, individual PAPs may be using different reservation utilities
(due to, say, access to different adoption channels). We have estimated the parameters of equation (3)
using a conditional logit with PAP-month fixed effects, and we find coefficients βθ that are virtually
identical to those we present below.
Table 3 below presents the results of probit estimations targeted at assessing PAPs’ preferences
over different attributes and their dependence on PAPs’ categories. We cluster standard errors by
child-PAP pair to account for serial correlation, since a PAP’s application is kept on the website
until the baby is matched. Here and throughout the rest of the regression tables unless otherwise
indicated, the t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
The first column of Table 3 refers to the behavior of the entire PAP population. It corresponds
to a model in which the different categories of PAPs in our sample—straight couples, gay men,
single women, lesbian couples, and foreign PAPs—are characterized by the same utility function—
namely, the coefficients βθ in (3) are restricted to be identical across PAPs—but may have different
thresholds (captured by the dummy variables corresponding to PAPs’ categories) due to the different
57Formally, PAPs’ threshold u¯PAP (θ, a) depends on the PAPs’ unobserved attributes a. Since we assume that these
attributes do not enter directly into the PAPs’ utility assessments, our estimations are not affected by the inherent aggre-
gation over these unobserved characteristics.
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Dependent Variable: All Straight PAP Gay PAP† Lesbian PAP† Single PAP Foreign PAP†
PAP Applies for Baby
♠ Activity Window: 10 Days
Already Born (d) -0.016* -0.021** -0.074 -0.064 0.026 -0.025**
(-2.35) (-3.15) (-1.48) (-0.84) (0.84) (-2.66)
Months to Birth -0.001** -0.001** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*
(-3.26) (-3.29) (-0.77) (-0.54) (-1.13) (-2.50)
Finalization Cost in $10,000s -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.013 -0.091* -0.020* -0.024***
(-5.69) (-4.93) (-0.58) (-2.57) (-2.16) (-5.89)
African-American Girl -0.052*** -0.045*** -0.181** -0.189** -0.052* -0.039***
(-6.22) (-4.98) (-2.80) (-2.66) (-2.18) (-3.51)
African-American Boy -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.047 -0.093 -0.077** -0.062***
(-7.70) (-6.89) (-0.76) (-1.07) (-2.74) (-5.19)
African-American Unknown Gender -0.069*** -0.067*** -0.091 -0.089 -0.073*** -0.061***
(-8.15) (-7.19) (-1.31) (-1.32) (-3.59) (-5.50)
Non-African-American Girl 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.121 0.229* 0.032 0.025*
(4.26) (3.49) (1.50) (2.57) (1.38) (2.49)
Non-African-American Boy -0.007 -0.010 0.014 0.115 0.001 0.003
(-1.06) (-1.43) (0.25) (1.90) (0.07) (0.34)
Hispanic 0.002 0.004 0.117 -0.023 -0.024 0.005
(0.27) (0.49) (1.47) (-0.21) (-0.95) (0.48)
Year 2004 (d) -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.035 -0.088 0.014 -0.052***
(-7.79) (-6.15) (-0.59) (-1.52) (0.56) (-6.37)
Year 2005 (d) -0.036*** -0.020** -0.056 -0.076 -0.003 -0.043***
(-5.68) (-2.90) (-1.07) (-1.40) (-0.14) (-4.36)
Year 2006 (d) -0.009 0.009 0.119 -0.060 0.012 -0.006
(-1.24) (1.03) (1.30) (-0.93) (0.36) (-0.57)
Year 2007 (d) -0.024*** -0.005 0.025 -0.190*** 0.034 -0.022*
(-3.65) (-0.59) (0.44) (-6.11) (0.74) (-2.27)
Year 2008 (d) 0.014* 0.029** 0.012 0.067 0.042 0.026*
(2.00) (3.19) (0.31) (1.55) (1.82) (2.32)
Gay PAP 0.061***
(4.78)
Lesbian PAP 0.093***
(7.71)
Single PAP 0.003
(0.45)
Foreign PAP 0.077***
(7.21)
Probability for Mean Attributes 0.086 0.072 0.165 0.193 0.079 0.091
Probability for Base Case ♥ 0.073 0.115 0.172 0.263 0.094 0.151
χ2 407.23 203.14 37.39 55.51 42.27 148.01
Log-Likelihood -205182.0 -170467.6 -27102.0 -29930.5 -25409.0 -208980.9
Observations 818413 708443 66190 60804 96665 734659
PAP-Babies 29053 25459 2382 2134 3134 27128
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Standard Errors Clustered by PAP-Baby Pair. ♥
Note that the omitted category is an unknown-gender, non-African-American, unborn child who is less than one month to birth, with finalization costs
of $26,000 in 2009. †: Gay, lesbian, and foreign estimated using weighted probit.
Table 3: Determinants of PAPs’ Applications (Activity Window of 10 Days) – Marginal Effects for
Probit
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streams of children for whom they can be considered. The PAPs-category dummy variables in the
first column are significantly different from one another, highlighting the response of PAPs to the
matching dynamics. The remaining columns of Table 3 correspond to estimated models in which
different categories of PAPs are allowed to have different preferences. In what follows, we first
discuss the aggregate preferences over children’s attributes and then compare estimated preferences
across different categories of PAPs.
The omitted category corresponding to all estimations reported in Table 3 is a 2009 baby, a
month before birth, whose gender is still unknown, whose race composition is zero percent African-
American, and whose adoption finalization costs are $26, 000. This omitted category of children
has a 7.3% probability of receiving an application, while a child whose attributes correspond to the
population means (as reported in Table 1) receives an application with a probability of 8.6%.
According to the third and fourth columns of Table 3, gay and lesbian couples have a significantly
higher probability of submitting an application than straight couples. Indeed, the probability of
submitting an application for the child whose attributes correspond to the population mean is 7.2%
for straight couples, 16.5% for gay PAPs, 19.3% for lesbian PAPs, 7.9% for single women, and 9.1%
for foreign PAPs. These can be partly explained by the constraints that gay and lesbian couples face
when adopting a baby: Since many of the children on this website are not available to them, gay and
lesbian couples conceivably compensate by applying more frequently when they can.58
5.1 Preferences over Gender
In our data, the gender of each baby is “boy,” “girl,” or “unknown.” A baby of unknown gender is
either a baby at an earlier stage of gestation or a baby who is less likely to have received medical
attention than a baby whose gender is known. In order not to confound gender and health effects,
we measure the PAPs’ gender preference by comparing the probabilities of receiving an application
between girls and boys.
58As mentioned before, these baseline probabilities confound the differing reservation utilities and the constant terms
in the utility functions corresponding to different categories of PAPs and, therefore, should be interpreted with caution.
In particular, the differences between these probabilities do not fully mirror the differences between the coefficients of
the dummy variables corresponding to PAP categories in the first column of the table.
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Non-African-American girls have a probability of receiving an application that is 3.6% higher
than non-African-American boys, a large effect given that the child with mean attributes has a prob-
ability of 8.6% of receiving an application. In other words, PAPs have a positive and sizable pref-
erence in favor of (non-African-American) girls. We can quantify the gender preference in dollar
terms by comparing the effect of gender to the effect of adoption finalization costs. The increase in
desirability of a non-African-American girl with respect to a non-African-American boy is equiv-
alent to a decrease of $16, 000 in finalization costs.59 This higher desirability of girls is consistent
with anecdotal evidence reported by adoption agencies and the popular press covering the adoption
process.60 It is also consistent with adoption outcomes in the U.S. Indeed, the Census 2000 reported
47% male adopted children as compared with 51% male biological children (see Kreider, 2003).
A preference for girls has also been documented for biological mothers by Gallup polls, though,
interestingly, biological fathers tend to report a preference for boys.
In our data, the preference for girls is apparent, though somewhat different, across all categories
of PAPs. Lesbian couples exhibit, by far, the most intense preference for non-African-American
girls. Indeed, for non-African-American children, the estimated difference in application probabil-
ities between girls and boys is 3.5% for straight couples, 10.7% for gay couples, 11.4% for lesbian
couples, 3.1% for single women, and 2.2% for foreign PAPs. The large gender preferences pertain-
ing to gay and straight PAPs suggest that women’s preference for girls is not the sole driving force
behind this preference.61 We note that there is a strand of literature based on hypothetical surveys
of different classes of PAPs regarding preferences over children’s gender (see Goldberg, 2009, and
references therein). Our results are the first to report a stronger preference over children’s gender for
same-sex than for straight PAPs.
Table 3 also highlights a positive and sizable (although not statistically significant) preference
for African-American girls with respect to African-American boys. In particular, the difference
59Note that if the finalization costs are positively correlated with some unobservable but desirable child attributes,
$16, 000 becomes an upper bound of the willingness to pay for a non-African-American girl with respect to a non-
African-American boy.
60See, for instance, Slate (1/16/2004).
61We should mention that the gender biases we observe in gay men and single women, despite being large in sizes,
are not significant due to the scarcity of observations.
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between the application probabilities for an African-American boy and an African-American girl
is 1.8%. This difference results in an overall application probability of 3.4% for African-American
girls and 1.6% for African-American boys. In other words, the probability of an African-American
girl receiving an application is more than double that of an African-American boy. In relative terms,
the gender preference for African-American children is larger than the preference for non-African-
American children.
This observation is compatible with the idea that girls are viewed as “safer” in terms of dys-
functional behavior and are, therefore, more appealing candidates for adoption.62 Furthermore, this
conjecture would suggest that the gender gap should be stronger for African-American children, for
whom the gap in terms of negative outcomes is greater between the genders.63
We note that the substantial preference for girls we document constitutes a reversal, in the adop-
tion environment, of the preference for sons identified by the literature studying the preferences
over gender of biological children by looking at indirect indicators such as divorce, likelihood of
the mother’s remarriage, etc. For instance, Dahl and Moretti (2008) find that first-born daughters
are associated with a range of negative predicaments for the survival of couples.64 Since the Census
2000 suggests that approximately 50% of households containing adopted children do not include
any biological child, it is difficult to explain this inconsistency by the mere ordering of children in
the family.65
62There are some data backing such perceptions. For instance, the U.S. Department of Justice reports that lifetime
chances of a person going to prison are significantly higher for men (11.3%) than for women (1.8%). Also, girls are less
likely to develop behavioral problems such as autism spectrum disorders (four times more prevalent in boys than in girls,
according to the Autism Society of America), or ADHD (diagnosed two to four times as frequently in boys as in girls,
see Dulcan, 1997). This conjecture has been mentioned repeatedly in the popular press, see, e.g., Slate (10/14/2003 and
1/16/2004).
63In terms of incarceration, the U.S. Department of Justice reports that the imprisonment statistics in 2001 were:
16.6% for African-American males, 7.7% for Hispanic males, 2.6% for Caucasian males, 1.7% for African-American
females, 0.7% for Hispanic females, and 0.3% for Caucasian females.
64Specifically, Dahl and Moretti (2008) report that (i) women are less likely to remarry if they have a first-born
daughter than if they have a first-born son; (ii) couples tend to divorce less often if they have first-born sons rather
first-born daughters; and (iii) the number of children is significantly higher in families with first-born girls.
65Indeed, such an explanation would require parents to have dramatically different gender preferences between first
and later children.
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5.2 Preferences over Race
To our knowledge, racial preferences over offspring have not yet been documented. Anecdotal evi-
dence from adoption agencies and facilitators suggest that there are greater difficulties in matching
African-American children with respect to other ethnicities. However, to this date, the only evidence
to support this claim had been the gap between the proportion of African-American children awaiting
adoption in the U.S. foster-care system (32% in 2006, according to the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services Report) and the proportion of African-American children in the total (domestic
and international) population of adoptees (16% in 2000, according to the Census). Although sug-
gestive, these statistics cannot be directly related to PAPs’ preferences. In that respect, our data set
provides a direct channel to estimate parents’ racial preferences in the adoption environment.66
Our results show that a baby’s aggregate probability of receiving an application is considerably
affected by his or her race. In particular, this probability dramatically decreases if the baby is, at
least partially, African-American.
Projecting the marginal effect linearly, the probability that a 100% African-American baby
(of unknown gender) receives an application is 1.7% in contrast to a probability of 13% for a
0% African-American baby.67 Similarly, application probabilities decrease dramatically for both
African-American girls and boys. In other words, PAPs in our sample exhibit a large and negative
preference against African-American children.
Again, the estimated effect of finalization costs in Table 3 allows us to convert the racial prefer-
ence into dollars. The increase in desirability of a non-African-American baby with respect to one
with mean attributes is equivalent to $38, 000 decrease in adoption finalization costs. In fact, using
the linear interpolation described above, as well as the incidence of the African-American attribute
in our sample, we obtain a willingness to pay for a 100% African-American baby with respect to a
66Estimating preferences over physical characteristics of biological children is inherently difficult due to the limited
choice parents have over offsprings’ appearance. Furthermore, according to the Census 2000, only 4% of marriages in
the U.S. are interracial, so variation in the race of biological children may be challenging to assess.
67The 13% probability is derived through a linear interpolation of the 1.7% probability of application for a 100%
African-American baby (of unknown gender) and the 8.6% probability of application for the baby with mean attributes
(according to Table 1, such a baby is 38.9% African-American).
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0% African-American baby as high as $62, 000.68
Physical similarity may be underlying these preferences. In fact, preference for similarity, or ho-
mophily, is a well-known and documented phenomenon in the sociology literature (see McPherson,
Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001 and references therein).69 In the context of adoption, homophily may
manifest itself in the desire of PAPs to adopt children who are similar to them and could, therefore,
appear as their biological offspring. Since the large majority of PAPs in our data set are Caucasian,
homophily would be consistent with a negative attitude toward African-American children.70
Hispanic children account for 12.8% of children on the website. However, we do not find a racial
preference for or against Hispanics. The estimated desirability of Caucasian and Hispanic children
is roughly identical, with a non-significant increase of the application probability of 0.2% if the baby
is Hispanic. To the extent that Hispanic children may look different than Caucasian children, this
suggests that a preference for physical similarity alone cannot account for the racial preferences we
observe.
In terms of different PAP categories, we find that the preference against African-American chil-
dren is similar across straight, gay men, lesbian couples. The negative effect on the application
probability for an African-American child of a straight couple is −4.5% for a girl, −6.7% for a
boy, and −6.7% for a child of unknown gender, off an application probability of 7.2% for a child
with mean attributes. This same effect on the application probability of gay men is −18.1% for a
girl, −4.7% for a boy and −9.1% for a child of unknown gender, off an application probability of
16.5% for a child with mean attributes. Likewise, this effect for lesbian couples is −18.9% for a
girl, −9.3% for a boy, and −8.9% for a child of unknown gender, off an application probability of
19.3% for a child with mean attributes. These observations suggest that the racial preference against
68On the other hand, as before, if the finalization costs are positively correlated with some unobservable but desirable
child attributes, our estimate for the willingness to pay for a non-African-American baby with respect to an African-
American one should be revised downward.
69This desire for similarity would be in line with racial preferences over romantic partners documented by Fisman,
Iyengar, Kamenica, and Simonson (2006, 2008).
70Indeed, according to the Census 2000, only 12% of adoptive parents in the U.S. are African-American. In addition,
according to an informal assessment of the facilitator, the vast majority of the participating PAPs is Caucasian. African-
Americans and Hispanics constitute only an approximate 1% of the PAPs. African-American and Hispanic PAPs are
known to favor other adoption channels (local religious communities, extended families, etc.).
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African-American children is somewhat stronger (although in some cases not significantly so) for
gay men and lesbian couples than for straight couples.
Moreover, we find strong and significant racial preferences for single women, for whom we find
an effect on the application probability for an African-American child of −5.2% for a girl, −7.7%
for a boy, and −7.3% for a baby of unknown gender, off an application probability of 7.9% for a
child with mean attributes.
Finally, the foreign PAPs’ racial preference is somewhat weaker than that identified for straight
couples. Indeed, the overall probabilities of submitting an application for African-American girls,
African-American boys, and African-American children of unknown gender are consistently higher
for foreign PAPs (5.2%, 2.9%, and 3%, respectively) than for straight couples (2.7%, 0.5%, and
0.5%, respectively).
5.3 Preferences over Time to Birth and Child Age
Understanding how the desirability of a baby changes during the pregnancy and after birth is relevant
for evaluating how a disruption of an adoption plan at different stages of the BMO’s pregnancy and
child growth can affect adoption outcomes.
Tables 3 and 10 show estimates regarding the desirability of unborn children over the pregnancy
and of already-born children. Table 3 reports a probability of 7% for an already-born child to receive
an application, while the same probability for an unborn child is 8.6%. Note that this significant
decrease occurs despite the fact that the average age of already-born children in our sample is just
over 1 month.
Table 3 suggests a significant negative effect of time to birth for unborn children. In Table 10,
we allow for nonlinearities over the months to birth. We find that, while in the first 6 months of
pregnancy application probabilities increase rapidly, going monotonically from 3.6% to 7%, they
are fairly constant over the three months preceding birth.71
In principle, there are two opposing effects at work that influence children’s desirability over
71This is somewhat surprising in view of the documented importance of pre-natal care in early stages of pregnancy
(see, e.g., http://www.expectantmothersguide.com).
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time. On the one hand, a match occurring early in the pregnancy offers PAPs the possibility of
monitoring the BMO’s health habits and medical conditions for a longer portion of the pregnancy.72
On the other hand, several forces make BMOs early in their pregnancy potentially less appealing.
First, since by law the BMO cannot relinquish parental rights until after the birth, a BMO who is
in early pregnancy might be more tentative about relinquishing her baby for adoption and has more
time to reconsider her decision. Thus, BMOs that are in late pregnancy can be perceived as more
committed to the adoption plan. Second, since PAPs typically cover the BMO’s living and medical
expenses from the time of the match until the delivery, an early match could entail more risk with
respect to the ultimate costs.73 Indeed, if the BMO eventually reconsiders the adoption plan, most
of the costs incurred up to that point are non-recoverable for the PAPs. Our results show that the
effects that make a BMO that is closer to delivery more appealing to PAPs are dominant.
5.4 Preferences over Adoption Finalization Costs
Our analysis reveals that PAPs’ application behavior is significantly affected by the cost of final-
izing the adoption. However, the effects we find are not very large in aggregate terms. Indeed,
Table 3 shows that an increase in adoption finalization costs of $10, 000 decreases the probability of
receiving an application from 8.6% to 6.8%.
As it turns out, there is a strong dependence of adoption finalization costs on children’s attributes.
We find that African-American children of unknown gender are associated with costs that are $7, 700
lower relative to non-African-American children of unknown gender. In addition, non-African-
American boys are associated with costs that are $1, 900 lower than non-African-American girls
(see Table 11 in the Appendix). While these differences are significant, notice that they are far
smaller than the differences in willingness to pay discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. Thus, while
differences in costs mitigate the differences in desirability for race and gender, they provide only
72It is often the case that, after the match takes place, the matched PAPs monitor the BMO’s medical condition
and lifestyle. Depending on PAPs’ state of residence, this can be done, for example, by offering the BMO to move
temporarily to the PAPs’ geographical area or home until the delivery.
73Detailed information we collected on auxiliary cases suggests that out of the total adoption finalization costs, up to
60% is non-refundable in the event the match falls through.
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partial compensation.74
Finally, we find that alternative PAP categories respond quite differently to changes in adoption
finalization costs. Indeed, lesbian couples seem to respond to changes in adoption finalization costs
more than straight and gay couples, single women and foreign PAPs. Thus a $10, 000 increase in
adoption finalization costs reduces the desirability of a child by 1.6% for straight couples, 1.3% for
gay men, 9.1% for lesbian couples, 2% for single women, and 2.4% for foreigners. The sensitivity
of these categories is consistent with the Census 2000, which reports that adoptive straight couples
and gay men are, on average, wealthier than single women and lesbian couples.
5.5 Selection into the Matching Process
A natural concern regarding our analysis pertains to the selection of participants on both sides into
the matching process. In particular, observed characteristics of children (such as gender and race)
may signal important health and behavioral attributes. In turn, PAPs may take into account the
signaling aspect of observed characteristics when applying for children. Estimated preferences may
then simply reflect PAPs’ concerns regarding health and behavior. On the other side of the process,
the preferences of the PAPs that select into the facilitator’s operations may not be representative of
the entire population of adoptive parents.
5.5.1 Adverse Selection of BMOs
We obtained auxiliary data from the facilitator containing more detailed information about 125
BMOs corresponding to recently posted cases. These data document BMOs’ age, medical history,
education background, criminal record, as well as drug and alcohol abuse. If observed character-
istics are proxies for any of these, we should observe a nontrivial correlation between observed
characteristics and indicators of health and behavioral issues.
Table 4 reports means of the BMOs’ health, demographic, and behavioral markers conditional
on the children’s gender and race.
74We stress that even though costs depend to some extent on children’s attributes and are therefore not exogenous, the
preferences we estimate using our application regressions remain valid since we effectively control for this dependence.
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African-American Gender
< 50% ≥ 50% Boy Girl Unknown
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N
Pre-Natal Care∗ 0.90 63 0.87 39 0.83 30 0.88 32 0.90 36
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03)
Criminal Record♦ 0.58 36 0.47 19 0.53 19 0.46 13 0.60 20
(0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11)
Serious Health Problems† 0.50 56 0.39 31 0.45 29 0.54 24 0.40 30
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Serious Drug Use‡ 0.36 42 0.17 24 0.36 28 0.35 17 0.11 18
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08)
Obesity (BMI Above 30) 0.21 68 0.14 36 0.08 37 0.21 29 0.29 34
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
Age 28.3 74 28.2 38 29.3 40 28.31 32 26.89 36
(0.7) (0.9) (0.91) (1.01) (0.82)
Education♠ 2.04 56 2.15 33 2.13 38 1.81 26 2.24 21
(0.11) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17)
Standard Errors in parenthesis. ∗ Pre-Natal Care refers to a binary variable that records whether the BMO received medical attention
during the pregnancy. ♦ Criminal Record refers to felony convictions or jail time. † Serious Health Problems include cancer, diabetes,
heart condition, coma, epilepsy, severe depression, and chlamydia during pregnancy. ‡ Serious Drug Use include meth, crack, heroin,
cocaine, amphetamines, and heavy alcohol consumption during pregnancy. ♠ Education refers to the last grade completed as follows:
1 for some high school, 2 for completed HS/GED, 3 for some college, and 4 for a college degree.
Table 4: BMOs’ Selection
Regarding gender, the cases corresponding to boys and girls do not appear significantly different
from one another (with 10% confidence) in any of the dimensions we consider.
Regarding race, we have split the data according to whether the race composition of the child
is above or below 50% African-American.75 Overall, we find that African-American BMOs, who
are associated with the less desirable children according to our preference analysis in Section 5.2,
consistently exhibit slightly superior values in each of the markers. The level of pre-natal care, age,
and education achievement are all very similar across the two groups of BMOs. However, criminal
records, serious health problems, serious drug abuse, and obesity are more frequent (albeit not in a
statistically significant way, even with 10% confidence) among the less African-American cases.
75Of the 125 cases in our additional data, 47 involve children whose race composition is at least partly African-
American. Of these, 3 children are 25% African-American, 21 are 50% African-American, and 23 are fully African-
American. The division of the data utilized to create the table therefore corresponds to a median split over these cases.
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5.5.2 Selection of PAPs
Using the Census 2000, we can compare aggregate characteristics of adopted children in the U.S.
and of matched children in our data set.76 Specifically, the Census identifies 54% of adopted chil-
dren as girls. In our data set, 22% of posted cases correspond to girls and 30% to boys (with the
remaining cases corresponding to unborn children of unknown gender). Out of matched cases in
which the children’s gender is known, 49% correspond to girls, while 51% correspond to boys. This
difference is consistent with the preference for girls we have identified. However, the comparison
with the Census figures suggests that PAPS who select into our data set are, if anything, more open
to adopting a boy relative to the average adopting household in the U.S.
With respect to race, the Census reports 18% of adopted children as African-American, while
only 6.4% of adopted children are reported as African-American when the head of the household
is classified as Caucasian (the Census’ data is based on self-reported coarse classification of race).
In our data, of all cases of matched children (through the facilitator or through other channels),
54% correspond to children who are at at least partially African-American and 24% correspond
to children who are 100% African-American. Recall that PAPs in our data set are virtually all
Caucasian. This suggests that PAPs who select into our data set are, if anything, more open to
adopting an African-American child than the average adopting household in the U.S.
6 Birth Mothers’ Choices and Matching Outcomes
Conditional on putting up their children for adoption through an agency and the facilitator, BMOs
make two distinct choices that we observe in our data: Ex-ante, they decide which categories of
PAPs are acceptable, and, ex-post, they resolve the case by selecting one of the PAP applications
received, deciding to parent, or losing contact with the facilitator.
As discussed in Section 4, the ex-ante choice of acceptable categories of PAPs cannot be ex-
plained by baby attributes, as can be seen in Table 12 in the Appendix. In fact, the only significant
76As mentioned, all reported figures are derived from the authors’ own tabulation using the 5% PUMS for domestic
adoptions of children under the age of 10.
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predictors of the choice of acceptable categories are the year in which the cases were presented and
the adoption finalization costs. Specifically, both gay men and lesbian PAPs were significantly less
likely to be acceptable prior to 2007 (by 18% − 30% between 2004 and 2006, relative to 2009).
According to the time trends reported in Table 7 in the Appendix, the fraction of gay, lesbian, and
foreign PAPs was fairly stable through time. In that respect, the increase in BMOs’ propensity to
allow same-sex PAPS may reflect a shift in BMOs’ preferences (mirroring important ideological and
political changes, e.g., legalization of gay marriages in several states). In addition, a BMO’s deci-
sion to allow applications from same-sex PAPs is significantly correlated with adoption finalization
costs, with higher costs corresponding to a substantially lower probability of same-sex PAPs being
declared acceptable.77
The propensity to consider foreign PAPs was consistently and significantly higher prior to 2008,
echoing the difficulties of adoption by foreign parents imposed by the ratification of the Hague
Convention in early 2008.
Regarding the BMOs’ selection of PAPs among those who apply, we cannot reject BMOs’ se-
lecting one of the applications randomly. Indeed, a model in which the chosen PAP is allowed to
depend on all observable characteristics (namely, the volume of applicants and the categories to
which they belong, in addition to the relevant baby’s attributes) generates no significant proxies of
choice (see Table 13 in the Appendix).
BMOs can also decide to match through channels other than the facilitator, or to forgo commit-
ting to an adoption agreement altogether (thereby deciding to parent or to relinquish their children
to foster care).78 In our sample, 13.4% of cases result in a match through the facilitator, and, overall,
70% of cases become matched through the facilitator or in other ways.79 Table 5 contains estimation
77We suspect that the correlation between banning same-sex couples and finalization costs is due to the fact that
adoption agencies that ban same-sex couples also make greater investments in legal and medical services, rather than
because of BMOs’ decisions per se.
78As mentioned above, foster care is notoriously harmful in terms of outcomes. It is associated with a far higher rate
of post-care homelessness (40% are homeless within 18 months of discharge, according to the U.S. General Account-
ing Office, 1999). Foster care is also associated with a much higher rate of incarceration. In California, 70% of all
penitentiary inmates have spent time in foster care (Select Committee Hearing of the California Legislature, 2006).
79Reported decisions to parent occurred in only 5% of cases, whereas cases were determined closed, without a speci-
fied resolution, in 4.8% of the cases (which may entail some unreported matches and some decisions to parent).
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results regarding the determinants of a successful match, through the facilitator or through other
channels, controlling for all observable baby characteristics.
Several insights come out of these estimations. First, the successful match of a baby is weakly
associated with some constraints imposed by BMOs. Specifically, the establishment of a match is
negatively linked with allowing applications from same-sex PAPs. We interpret this result as consis-
tent with the presence of some adoption agencies being particularly effective in finding matches and,
at the same time, more restrictive in their attitudes toward same-sex PAPs. Also, Table 5 suggests
that the matches through the facilitator are positively associated with allowing applications from
foreign PAPs.
Second, the application arrival rate significantly affects the likelihood of a match. In order
to get a sense of the magnitudes, and bearing in mind the fact that the average time from first
to last application for a baby on the website is 33 days, our estimations suggest that an increase
of three applications corresponds to the overall probability of a successful match increasing by
approximately 6%.
Third, the knowledge of a baby’s gender (be it a boy or a girl) is associated with a significantly
higher probability of a match. This is particularly intuitive in view of the distribution of the time to
birth. Recall that the average time to birth of an unborn baby in our sample is about two months. At
that stage, not knowing the gender of the child is a strong signal of very limited medical attention
(an ultrasound exam would reveal a child’s gender starting from approximately the 20th week of
gestation). In that respect, the knowledge of the child’s gender serves as a proxy for medical care
(and our results are consistent with the preference for girls identified through PAPs’ choices in
Section 5).
Last, on average, higher adoption finalization costs are linked with higher probabilities of a
match. Ceteris paribus, an increase of $10, 000 corresponds to an increase of 7% in the probability
of a match through the facilitator, and an increase of 12% in the probability of a reported match
through any channel. This result is consistent with adoption agencies playing an important role
in setting prices, and generating matches. Specifically, a link between costs and the probabilities
of a match may be the result of two effects: (i) more expensive agencies being more effective in
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Dependant Variable Matched Matched through Facilitator
Already Born (d) 0.04 -0.10***
(0.29) (-4.08)
Months from Presentation to Birth 0.01 0.00
(1.59) (0.56)
African-American 0.05 0.08
(0.69) (1.66)
Girl (d) 0.19** -0.03
(2.88) (-0.69)
Boy (d) 0.18** 0.04
(2.72) (0.92)
PAP Arrival Rate Per Day 0.61** 0.16**
(3.22) (2.75)
Finalization Cost (in 10 000s of dollars) 0.12* 0.07*
(2.41) (2.55)
Same-Sex PAP Allowed (d) -0.24** 0.04
(-2.74) (0.70)
Single PAP Allowed (d) -0.00 0.00
(-0.05) (0.04)
Foreign PAP Allowed (d) 0.02 0.07*
(0.24) (2.00)
Year 2005 (d) 0.14 -0.01
(1.26) (-0.21)
Year 2006 (d) 0.10 -0.01
(0.87) (-0.23)
Year 2007 (d) 0.03 0.03
(0.27) (0.37)
Year 2008 (d) -0.01 0.10
(-0.07) (1.08)
Probability for Mean Attributes 0.666 0.089
χ2 46.77 29.17
Log-Likelihood -162.9 -91.7
Babies 286 286
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Note that the
omitted category is an unknown-gender, non-African-American, unborn child who is less than one month to birth,
with finalization costs of $26,000 in 2009.
Table 5: Matching Regression – Marginal Effect from Probit of a Child Finding a Match.
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generating matches, and (ii) more expensive agencies targeting children that are desirable in terms
of unobserved characteristics, resulting in more successful matches.
7 Policy Implications
When considering the debate on whether or not to ban a certain category of PAPs from the adoption
process, there are two effects to consider. First, reducing the volume of participating PAPs will
potentially decrease the number of adopted children. We stress that reducing the number of adopted
children comes at significant costs. For example, Barth, Lee, Wildfire, and Guo (2006), as well
as Hansen and Hansen (2006), show that state and federal governments save between $65, 422 and
$126, 825 on the average child who enters foster care at age three if he or she is adopted rather
than remaining there throughout childhood. Furthermore, Hansen (2006) calculated that the human
service costs of adoption are about one-half the costs of long-term foster care.80 Second, given the
difference in preferences across PAP categories identified in Section 5, excluding particular PAPs
will affect the distribution of attributes (gender, race, etc.) of adopted children. In this section, we
provide counterfactual exercises that quantify these two effects for same-sex and foreign PAPs.
7.1 Gay and Lesbian Adoption
We start by noting that studies tracking adopted children identify some positive effects and no neg-
ative effects of adoption by gay or lesbian parents as opposed to heterosexual parents.81 Therefore,
given the likely costs generated by children that remain unmatched, the number of successful adop-
tions is a reasonable proxy for the effectiveness of the matching process. Therefore, we estimate the
impact of the participation of same-sex couples in the adoption process by assessing the number of
matches that would be lost should gay and lesbian PAPs be restricted from participating.82 In our
80She also found that when examining other social costs, such as reduced incarceration or increased education at-
tainment, each dollar spent on the adoption of children from foster care results in $2.45 to $3.26 in tangible benefits to
society.
81See Brewaeys, Ponjaert, Van Hall, and Golombok (1997); Golombok, Perry, Burston, Murray, Mooney-Sommer,
Stevens, and Golding (2003); Golombok, Spencer, and Rutter (1983); and Wainwright, Russell, and Patterson, (2004).
82In this counterfactual exercise, and in the one in Section 7.2, we study the comparative statics within one equilibrium
of the model presented in Section 4.
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data, same-sex couples are chosen by the BMOs in 12% of all cases of matched children for whom
we know the identity of the chosen PAP. This serves as an upper bound on the percentage of matches
that would have been lost had same-sex couples been prohibited from participating in the adoption
process. In order to generate a more conservative estimate, we assume that whenever we observe a
match, the BMO views all applicants as acceptable. In that case, banning same-sex applicants would
reduce the number of matches by the number of cases in which the child was ultimately adopted and
no application by heterosexual parents was submitted.83,84 This amounts to 6% of matched cases
in our data. This is clearly a large effect given that, according to Table 6, only 18.6% of matched
cases allow gay and lesbian PAPs to apply. This method is an underestimate of the loss of matched
children, in that it ignores two important elements of our environment. First, it ignores the fact that
certain heterosexual parents may not appear acceptable to some birth mothers. Second, it ignores the
endogenous effects on PAPs’ threshold attributes. Indeed, consider our underlying model. Reducing
the pool of potential parents would reduce the competition on the parents’ side and would lead to
an increase in the threshold utility u¯PAP . Consequently, fewer applications would be placed, and
potentially fewer matches would be created.
Obviously, this result depends on the participation rate of gay and lesbian PAPs in our match-
ing process, which is not necessarily representative of the overall gay and lesbian participation in
adoption overall. It would be interesting to convert our counterfactual exercise into an estimate of
the number of matches that would have been lost due to a gay and lesbian adoption ban, relative to
a world in which gays and lesbians are universally allowed to adopt (except for restrictions imposed
by the BMOs’ preferences). In order to do that, one would need recent estimates of the gay and
lesbian population and their propensity to adopt.
In terms of the attributes associated to children whose match would have been lost under our
counterfactual exercise, we find that 50% of severed matches correspond to boys (to be contrasted
83The significant variance observed in the number of applications BMOs receive by the time of a match suggests that
they are not determining their duration on the website based on the number of applications received.
84Since the same-sex classifications are probabilistic, if a child receives an application from n PAPs with probabilities
of being same-sex p1, ..., pn, the probability of all applicants being same-sex couples is
∏n
i=1 pi,which is the probability
at the root of our counterfactual estimation.
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with boys representing 24% of the overall observed matches). In terms of race, 62% of lost matches
correspond to African-American children (as compared with 37% of matched children being African-
American). This suggests that, while same-sex couples have strong preferences against boys and
African-American children, they still play an important role in their placement due to lower reser-
vation utilities, as we discussed in Section 5.
7.2 Foreign Adoptive Parents and the Hague Convention
As discussed in Section 2.3, the ratification of the Hague Convention in 2008 has made it difficult
for foreign PAPs to adopt domestically. In our sample, classification of PAPs as foreign is only
approximate in that our deductions are based on application behavior alone. Nonetheless, even with
this coarse classification, we observe sharp declines in the probability of PAPs being foreign: While
between 2004 and 2009 these probabilities varied between 56.3% and 60.3%, they are estimated at
50.3% in 2008 and at 37.4% in 2009. The concern regarding the reduction of foreign PAPs is similar
to that discussed with respect to gay and lesbian adoption bans. That is, a reduction of foreign PAPs
would potentially lead to a reduction in the volume of children that find an adoptive home.
We perform a similar counterfactual to the one done above. We calculate the expected number of
children that would have remained unmatched in our data had foreign PAPs been prohibited.85 We
find that, in expectation, 33% of matches would have been severed had foreign PAPs not participated
in the process.
While the precise value of 33% is derived from the way we classify PAPs as foreign, we note
that the qualitative impact is consistent with the preferences we estimate for foreign PAPs. Indeed,
foreign PAPs appear to exhibit more flexibility with respect to baby attributes since they apply
for more children than straight couples do. Therefore, removing them from the matching process
would clearly have a negative effect on matching probabilities. Given that the reduction in foreign
participation may be underestimated in our sample and that the outcomes of such bans are crucial for
policy decisions, a deeper investigation of the consequences of restrictions on international adoption
85As before, since the foreign classification is probabilistic, if a child receives an application from n PAPs with
corresponding probability of being foreign of p1, ..., pn, the probability of all applicants being foreign is
∏n
i=1 pi.
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is an important avenue for future research.
Foreign PAPs’ higher tolerance with respect to boys and African-American children ties directly
to the attributes associated with the lost matches. Indeed, we find that 50% of severed matches
correspond to boys, whereas African-Americans account for 55% of lost matches.
8 Conclusion
We collected a novel data set to track the matching of potential adoptive parents to birth mothers
looking to relinquish their child for adoption. The detailed data on over 800 children allow us to
estimate parents’ preferences over child attributes, most notably over gender, race, time to birth, and
adoption finalization costs.
We find clear patterns in parents’ preferences. First, girls are consistently preferred to boys, and
Caucasians and Hispanics are consistently preferred to African-Americans. In monetary terms, the
increase in desirability of a girl relative to a boy can be compensated by a decrease of approximately
$16, 000 in adoption finalization costs. Similarly, the increase in desirability of a non-African-
American baby with respect to an African-American baby (both of unknown gender) is equivalent
to a decrease of at least $38, 000 in adoption finalization cost. Second, adoption outcomes are some-
what fragile to the timing at which birth mothers enter the process, with adoptive parents preferring
children who are unborn, but relatively close to birth. Third, adoption finalization costs impact de-
mand significantly. An increase in adoption finalization costs of $10, 000 decreases the aggregate
probability of receiving an application from 8.6% to 6.8%.
Different categories of adoptive parents—straight, gay, lesbian, single, or foreign—have differ-
ent behaviors in the matching process. We find that gays men and lesbian couples submit appli-
cations to 16.5% and 19.3% of children, respectively, while straight couples submit applications to
only 7.2% of children. However, we do not find evidence that same-sex couples or single women
are less biased than straight couples. If anything, they seem to have stronger biases in favor of girls
and against African-American children. On the other hand, foreign adoptive parents exhibit weaker
gender and racial preferences with respect to other parents categories.
43
The chances that a child put up for adoption will be successfully matched to adoptive parents
depend on several crucial characteristics—namely, how selective the birth mother is about the cat-
egories of parents she is willing to consider; the rate at which potential adoptive parents express
interest in adopting the child; and whether the child’s gender is known (presumably, proxying for
medical monitoring such as ultrasound exams). Furthermore, successful matches are associated with
higher adoption finalization costs.
These observations feed into important policy debates regarding the inclusion of specific cate-
gories of parents in the adoption process. First, the recent political shifts allowing for more house-
holds comprised of gay and lesbian partners has triggered discussion over the impacts of gay and
lesbian participation on the domestic adoption process. A simple counterfactual experiment banning
same-sex parents from our sample lowers the number of adopted children by about 6%. Therefore,
such a ban could increase the fraction of children in foster care, which has well documented detri-
mental effects. In a different sphere, the recent ratification of the Hague Convention has made
international adoption far more challenging and raised international controversy on the impacts of
these new barriers. Again, a simple counterfactual test banning foreign parents, who are shown to be
rather flexible in terms of preferences over children’s attributes, reveals an estimated 33% decrease
in match probabilities.
While adoption is far-reaching in the U.S. (2.5% of all children are adopted in an industry that
generates 2 − 3 billion dollars annually), it is still an unexplored territory for economists. In our
context, the domestic adoption process is unique in that it allows us to answer fundamental ques-
tions regarding preferences over race and gender in a situation in which outcomes entail significant
commitment. Thus, standard models of search and matching can be used for estimation purposes.
Our study suggests that the adoption industry can be further investigated in several directions.
For example, our results are consistent with adoption agencies carrying an important role in the
setting of finalization costs and the generation of successful matches between adoptive parents and
birth mothers. In particular, the difference in adoption finalization costs across genders is difficult
to explain with the mere difference in BMOs’ expenses. This is suggestive of the limited regulation
the adoption industry is subject to. Accounting for particular agencies’ effects would be especially
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useful for understanding the operation of the adoption process. From an institutional-design perspec-
tive, our analysis opens the door for contemplating alternative mechanisms geared at minimizing the
chances that children remain unmatched. For instance, one could consider a more centralized design
in which both adoptive parents and birth mothers submit preferences to a clearinghouse (much as in
several countries throughout the world, such as Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom).
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Appendix
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Already Born 0.111 0.315 0 1 619
Number of Interested PAPs 3.158 2.217 1 15 619
Number of Interested Same-Sex PAPs 0.672 1.042 0 9.5 323
Number of Interested Single PAPs 0.362 0.643 0 4 323
PAP Arrival Rate Per Day 0.235 0.37 0.003 4 590
Gender Unknown 0.523 0.500 0 1 618
Girl 0.235 0.424 0 1 618
Boy 0.243 0.429 0 1 618
African-American 0.387 0.404 0 1 619
Caucasian 0.375 0.382 0 1 619
Hispanic 0.143 0.286 0 1 619
Same-Sex PAPs Allowed 0.186 0.39 0 1 323
Single PAPs Allowed 0.588 0.493 0 1 323
Foreign PAPs Allowed 0.87 0.337 0 1 323
Matched on the Website 0.186 0.389 0 1 619
Days on Site 45 67 1 469 590
Days from Presentation to Birth 66 123 -1657 575 583
Table 6: Summary Statistics of BMOs if matched
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PAP
Total Number of PAPs 135 278 149 116 84 82
Foreign PAP 0.575 0.563 0.588 0.603 0.503 0.374
Gay PAP 0.030 0.065 0.067 0.085 0.101 0.089
Lesbian PAP 0.061 0.058 0.056 0.093 0.117 0.100
Single PAP 0.179 0.127 0.114 0.083 0.193 0.154
BABY
Number of Babies 139 239 141 129 117 126
Same-Sex PAP Allowed 0.302 0.180 0.156 0.736 0.333 0.333
Single PAP Allowed 0.784 0.644 0.518 0.868 0.598 0.643
Foreign PAP Allowed 0.892 0.891 0.887 0.968 0.782 0.651
African-American 0.447 0.460 0.370 0.329 0.350 0.329
Girl 0.302 0.205 0.234 0.0698 0.231 0.254
Boy 0.252 0.378 0.376 0.0923 0.393 0.333
Months to Birth 0.621 0.755 1.22 0.128 0.414 2.41
Finalization Cost 20522 22834 26543 27081 31076 31780
Table 7: Trends from 2004 to 2009
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Dependent Variable: All Straight PAP Gay PAP† Lesbian PAP† Single PAP Foreign PAP †
PAP Applies for Baby
Activity Window: 90 Days
Already Born (d) -0.009 -0.013* -0.062 -0.052 0.027 -0.016*
(-1.80) (-2.46) (-1.67) (-0.88) (1.08) (-2.21)
Months to Birth -0.001** -0.001** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*
(-2.85) (-2.75) (-1.17) (-0.37) (-1.06) (-2.06)
Finalization Cost in $10,000s -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.019 -0.075** -0.018* -0.019***
(-5.83) (-5.04) (-1.04) (-2.66) (-2.50) (-5.90)
African-American Girl -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.147** -0.144* -0.039* -0.030***
(-6.12) (-5.04) (-2.75) (-2.47) (-2.17) (-3.49)
African-American Boy -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.048 -0.070 -0.057** -0.046***
(-7.47) (-6.68) (-0.95) (-0.99) (-2.59) (-4.96)
African-American Unknown Gender -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.077 -0.071 -0.054*** -0.048***
(-8.07) (-7.13) (-1.39) (-1.30) (-3.51) (-5.49)
Non-African-American Girl 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.111 0.187** 0.023 0.019*
(4.29) (3.57) (1.78) (2.64) (1.33) (2.45)
Non-African-American Boy -0.005 -0.007 0.008 0.085 0.003 0.002
(-1.06) (-1.33) (0.18) (1.79) (0.16) (0.26)
Hispanic 0.002 0.003 0.071 -0.013 -0.016 0.004
(0.26) (0.47) (1.14) (-0.15) (-0.79) (0.45)
Year 2004 (d) -0.030*** -0.023*** -0.031 -0.114** -0.002 -0.036***
(-7.27) (-4.98) (-0.67) (-3.07) (-0.11) (-5.47)
Year 2005 (d) -0.029*** -0.018*** -0.052 -0.083* -0.012 -0.032***
(-6.20) (-3.35) (-1.31) (-2.16) (-0.72) (-4.18)
Year 2006 (d) -0.020*** -0.007 0.063 -0.068 -0.030* -0.016*
(-4.40) (-1.29) (0.95) (-1.50) (-2.24) (-2.08)
Year 2007 (d) -0.026*** -0.013* 0.005 -0.179*** -0.007 -0.021**
(-6.36) (-2.44) (0.11) (-7.53) (-0.30) (-3.05)
Year 2008 (d) -0.003 0.003 -0.013 0.016 0.034 0.003
(-0.72) (0.52) (-0.48) (0.49) (1.81) (0.44)
Gay PAP 0.050***
(5.27)
Lesbian PAP 0.075***
(8.09)
Single PAP 0.001
(0.10)
Foreign PAP 0.058***
(7.30)
Probability for Mean Attributes 0.066 0.052 0.126 0.158 0.0572 0.068
Probability for Base Case ♥ 0.060 0.093 0.153 0.255 0.086 0.118
χ2 385.90 148.51 30.36 63.20 42.60 105.94
Log-Likelihood -224071.1 -185977.4 -28673.5 -32214.2 -26979.0 -229591.9
Observations 1088210 944423 80828 74422 125246 969035
PAP-Babies 33403 29277 2698 2440 3484 31245
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Standard Errors Clustered by PAP-Baby Pair. ♥ Note that the omitted category is a gender unknown, non-African-American, unborn child, less than
one month to birth, with finalization cost of $26,000 in 2009. †: Gay, lesbian, and foreign estimated using weighted probit.
Table 8: Determinants of PAPs Applications (Activity Window of 90 Days) – Marginal Effects for
Probit
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Dependent Variable: All Straight PAP Gay PAP† Lesbian PAP† Single PAP Foreign PAP †
PAP Applies for Baby
♣ Application at Some Point in Time
Already Born (d) -0.006 -0.008* -0.028 0.029 0.021 -0.010
(-1.40) (-1.98) (-0.79) (0.49) (1.11) (-1.70)
Months to Birth -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(-1.12) (-1.14) (0.03) (0.98) (-0.91) (-0.64)
Finalization Cost in $10,000s -0.012*** -0.011*** 0.008 -0.029 -0.016* -0.015***
(-6.55) (-5.91) (0.45) (-1.24) (-2.45) (-6.28)
African-American Girl -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.134** -0.119* -0.059*** -0.029***
(-6.88) (-5.47) (-2.77) (-2.16) (-3.65) (-4.29)
African-American Boy -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.068 -0.096 -0.071*** -0.049***
(-9.86) (-8.81) (-1.63) (-1.85) (-3.76) (-7.08)
African-American Unknown Gender -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.119*** -0.039 -0.039** -0.040***
(-9.46) (-8.55) (-3.62) (-0.94) (-2.73) (-6.65)
Non-African-American Girl 0.016*** 0.013** -0.053 0.033 0.037* 0.010
(3.71) (3.06) (-0.94) (0.50) (2.26) (1.72)
Non-African-American Boy -0.011** -0.011** -0.062 0.060 -0.025 -0.005
(-2.77) (-2.64) (-1.62) (1.33) (-1.68) (-0.94)
Hispanic -0.005 -0.001 0.072 -0.052 -0.043* -0.005
(-1.20) (-0.31) (1.27) (-0.73) (-2.26) (-0.93)
Year 2004 (d) -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.036 -0.109** -0.017 -0.026***
(-9.92) (-6.84) (-1.02) (-3.09) (-1.03) (-4.68)
Year 2005 (d) -0.027*** -0.017*** -0.017 -0.054 -0.009 -0.017**
(-7.09) (-4.32) (-0.41) (-1.25) (-0.60) (-2.76)
Year 2006 (d) -0.022*** -0.012** 0.164* -0.099** -0.041*** -0.011
(-6.54) (-2.99) (1.99) (-2.76) (-3.74) (-1.69)
Year 2007 (d) -0.031*** -0.021*** -0.048 -0.160*** -0.027 -0.024***
(-9.28) (-4.27) (-1.26) (-7.27) (-1.50) (-3.65)
Year 2008 (d) 0.012* 0.019** 0.043 -0.002 0.030 0.039***
(2.26) (3.24) (1.05) (-0.05) (1.37) (3.95)
Gay PAP 0.044***
(5.78)
Lesbian PAP 0.062***
(9.71)
Single PAP 0.010*
(2.40)
Foreign PAP 0.058***
(9.16)
Probability for Mean Attributes 0.060 0.048 0.126 0.153 0.061 0.062
Probability for Base Case ♥ 0.056 0.088 0.164 0.260 0.109 0.095
χ2 624.32 264.07 53.36 36.77 39.19 199.20
Log-Likelihood -5987.7 -4974.9 -703.9 -822.5 -695.3 -6163.1
PAP-Babies 30457 26679 2162 1963 3183 27913
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Standard Errors Clustered by PAP-Baby Pair. ♥ Note
that the omitted category is gender unknown, non-African-American, unborn child who is less than one month to birth, with finalization cost of $26,000 in
2009.†: Gay, lesbian and foreign estimated using weighted probit. ♣ PAP submits an application at some point when the BMO is available on the website.
Activity window of 90 days.
Table 9: Determinants of PAPs’ Applications (Application at Some Point in Time) – Marginal
Effects for Probit
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Dependent Variable: All Straight PAP Gay PAP† Lesbian PAP† Single PAP Foreign PAP †
PAP Applies for Baby
Activity Window: 10 Days
Already Born (d) -0.013 -0.018** -0.045 -0.053 0.024 -0.022*
(-1.88) (-2.71) (-0.81) (-0.68) (0.74) (-2.39)
1 Month Before Birth (d) -0.000 -0.002 0.043 0.001 0.003 -0.002
(-0.07) (-0.59) (1.09) (0.03) (0.25) (-0.70)
2 Month Before Birth (d) 0.000 -0.001 0.059 0.004 -0.009 -0.002
(0.08) (-0.33) (1.42) (0.09) (-0.74) (-0.45)
3 Month Before Birth (d) -0.006 -0.007 0.056 -0.007 -0.017 -0.010
(-1.49) (-1.79) (1.22) (-0.16) (-1.32) (-1.84)
4 Month Before Birth (d) -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.048 -0.060 -0.020 -0.021***
(-3.89) (-3.57) (-1.43) (-1.43) (-1.42) (-3.98)
5 Month Before Birth (d) -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.066 -0.083 -0.022 -0.028***
(-5.60) (-5.27) (-1.88) (-1.89) (-1.45) (-4.74)
6 Month Before Birth (d) -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.061 -0.115** -0.020 -0.033***
(-5.43) (-5.01) (-1.33) (-2.91) (-1.07) (-4.52)
7 Month Before Birth (d) -0.045*** -0.045*** 0.067 -0.155*** -0.054*** -0.062***
(-7.83) (-7.75) (0.63) (-3.55) (-4.15) (-10.90)
8 Month Before Birth (d) -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.014 -0.196*** -0.066*** -0.069***
(-7.46) (-6.07) (-0.11) (-9.39) (-8.65) (-9.83)
Month After Birth -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 -0.001
(-0.65) (-1.60) (-0.60) (-1.58) (0.45) (-0.94)
Finalization Cost in 10 000’s of $ -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.017 -0.090** -0.022* -0.026***
(-6.37) (-5.58) (-0.76) (-2.61) (-2.34) (-6.54)
African-American Girl -0.064*** -0.056*** -0.205** -0.245*** -0.065** -0.054***
(-7.54) (-6.12) (-3.20) (-3.34) (-2.68) (-4.78)
African-American Boy -0.081*** -0.077*** -0.065 -0.151 -0.087** -0.075***
(-8.99) (-7.98) (-1.13) (-1.77) (-3.13) (-6.40)
African-American Unknown Gender -0.079*** -0.075*** -0.113 -0.144* -0.081*** -0.073***
(-9.28) (-8.14) (-1.69) (-2.20) (-3.88) (-6.57)
Non-African-American Girl 0.019** 0.016* 0.076 0.169 0.023 0.014
(2.79) (2.23) (0.98) (1.89) (0.97) (1.41)
Non-African-American Boy -0.015* -0.017* -0.014 0.058 -0.007 -0.007
(-2.34) (-2.47) (-0.26) (0.94) (-0.34) (-0.83)
Hispanic -0.003 -0.001 0.088 -0.081 -0.029 -0.002
(-0.45) (-0.12) (1.16) (-0.72) (-1.12) (-0.20)
Gay PAP 0.059***
(4.70)
Lesbian PAP 0.093***
(7.76)
Single PAP 0.004
(0.57)
Foreign PAP 0.076***
(7.26)
Years (d) X X X X X X
Probability for Mean Attributes 0.086 0.072 0.161 0.194 0.080 0.092
Probability for Base Case ♥ 0.092 0.143 0.182 0.357 0.121 0.188
χ2 462.43 256.42 65.40 73.67 65.67 210.93
Log-Likelihood -206421.9 -171588.1 -26844.0 -29869.6 -25557.9 -210405.7
Observations 825982 715179 67210 61560 97418 742059
PAP-Babies 29364 25746 2416 2161 3164 27431
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Standard Errors
Clustered by PAP-Baby Pair. ♥ Note that the omitted category is gender unknown non-African-American unborn child
with finalization cost of 26 000 dollars in 2009 who is less than one month from birth.†: Gay, lesbian, and foreign estimated
using weighted probit, with weights corresponding to probability that PAP is gay, lesbian or foreign respectively.
Table 10: Determinants of PAPs’ Applications (Activity Window of 10 days) – Marginal Effects for
Probit
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Dependent Variable Full Sample Unborn Born
Finalization Cost in $1, 000s I II III IV V VI
Already Born -1.14 -0.65
(-1.41) (-0.83)
Month to Birth -0.50** -0.28 -0.56** -0.41* -0.11 0.23
(-3.14) (-1.78) (-3.05) (-2.32) (-0.31) (0.59)
African-American Girl -8.77*** -7.99*** -9.55*** -8.52*** -5.32 -5.52
(-7.38) (-6.83) (-7.41) (-6.69) (-1.69) (-1.77)
African-American Boy -7.63*** -7.41*** -8.32*** -8.27*** -6.05* -5.21
(-6.69) (-6.66) (-6.50) (-6.64) (-2.29) (-1.98)
African-American Unknown Gender -7.74*** -7.71*** -8.59*** -8.35*** -3.91 -4.60
(-7.38) (-7.55) (-7.62) (-7.60) (-1.36) (-1.61)
Non-African-American Girl -0.03 -0.11 -0.37 -0.22 1.72 0.81
(-0.03) (-0.11) (-0.34) (-0.21) (0.60) (0.28)
Non-African-American Boy -1.93* -1.90* -2.13* -1.95* -0.63 -1.31
(-2.19) (-2.22) (-2.26) (-2.13) (-0.24) (-0.51)
Hispanic 0.29 0.19 -0.36 -0.54 2.88 2.91
(0.28) (0.19) (-0.30) (-0.47) (1.13) (1.16)
Asian 2.23 1.12 1.80 0.83 7.32 5.07
(0.92) (0.47) (0.73) (0.35) (0.54) (0.38)
Year 2004 -10.63*** -10.51*** -10.90*** -10.67*** -5.40 -4.66
(-10.76) (-10.73) (-10.68) (-10.58) (-0.83) (-0.72)
Year 2005 -9.01*** -9.55*** -9.27*** -9.77*** -2.95 -2.70
(-10.30) (-10.94) (-10.46) (-11.03) (-0.43) (-0.40)
Year 2006 -6.05*** -6.54*** -6.19*** -6.74*** -1.71 -0.58
(-6.08) (-6.66) (-5.96) (-6.56) (-0.26) (-0.09)
Year 2007 -5.58*** -4.44*** -4.90*** -4.17*** -1.86 0.02
(-5.42) (-4.26) (-4.15) (-3.60) (-0.28) (0.00)
Year 2008 -0.57 -1.37 -0.17 -0.96 -0.83 -1.02
(-0.54) (-1.32) (-0.16) (-0.92) (-0.12) (-0.14)
Single PAP Allowed 0.50 0.44 -0.02
(0.82) (0.67) (-0.01)
Same-Sex PAP Allowed -4.44*** -4.51*** -4.40*
(-6.40) (-6.03) (-2.11)
Foreign PAP Allowed 0.44 0.10 3.23
(0.58) (0.12) (1.40)
Constant 35.86*** 36.58*** 36.42*** 37.15*** 29.25*** 30.56***
(37.69) (37.19) (36.86) (36.41) (4.35) (4.51)
R2 0.38 0.42 0.43 0.47 0.17 0.22
Adjusted-R2 0.36 0.40 0.41 0.46 0.08 0.10
F-Stat 26.4 25.8 28.2 27.1 1.8 1.9
Babies 623 623 500 500 123 123
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Note that the omitted category is gender unknown non-African-American unborn child in 2009.
Table 11: Adoption Finalization Cost Regressions
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Dependent Variable Same-Sex PAPs Foreign PAPs Single PAPs
Allowed Allowed Allowed
Already Born 0.090 -0.087* 0.075
(1.71) (-2.16) (1.29)
Months to Birth -0.001 -0.004 0.000
(-0.38) (-0.94) (0.06)
Finalization Cost in $10,000s -0.020*** 0.000 -0.007*
(-6.77) (0.11) (-2.36)
African-American Girl -0.043 0.052 0.212*
(-0.57) (0.88) (2.42)
African-American Boy -0.133 0.016 0.112
(-1.82) (0.28) (1.46)
African-American Unknown Gender -0.002 0.019 0.147*
(-0.03) (0.37) (2.01)
Non-African-American Girl -0.088 -0.044 -0.076
(-1.24) (-0.94) (-1.12)
Non-African-American Boy -0.077 0.006 -0.008
(-1.25) (0.14) (-0.14)
Hispanic -0.085 0.075 0.026
(-1.10) (1.34) (0.36)
Year 2004 (d) -0.187*** 0.121*** 0.094
(-4.13) (4.63) (1.42)
Year 2005 (d) -0.303*** 0.157*** -0.028
(-7.73) (5.66) (-0.43)
Year 2006 (d) -0.230*** 0.133*** -0.204**
(-6.21) (5.93) (-2.81)
Year 2007 (d) 0.166* 0.179*** 0.175**
(2.02) (9.63) (2.86)
Year 2008 (d) -0.038 0.089** -0.017
(-0.64) (3.27) (-0.26)
Probability for Mean Attributes♥ 0.280 0.868 0.672
χ2 142.38 63.20 76.06
Log-Likelihood -341.8 -266.6 -399.0
Babies 683 683 683
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001. ♥ Note that the omitted category is gender unknown non-African-
American unborn child with finalization cost of $26,000 in 2009.
Table 12: Determinants of Restrictions: Marginal Effects for Probit
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Dependent Variable: Chosen PAP I II III IV
Same-Sex PAP 0.09
(0.94)
Single PAP -0.08 -0.08 -0.27
(-0.64) (-0.69) (-1.71)
Gay PAP -0.04 -0.23
(-0.32) (-1.41)
Lesbian PAP 0.24 0.29
(1.55) (1.53)
Foreign PAP -0.06 -0.03
(-0.41) (-0.15)
Baseline 0.507 0.506 0.427 0.484
χ2 1.41 3.91 5.13 0.02
Log-Likelihood -144.9 -143.6 -90.7 -95.0
Observations 517 517 323 329
∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 13: Marginal Effect (at Fixed Effect=0) of Multinomial Logit of Chosen PAP.
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